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Abstract
Users often wish to communicate anonymously on the Internet, for example in group dis-
cussion or instant messaging forums. Existing solutions are vulnerable to misbehaving users,
however, who may abuse their anonymity to disrupt communication. Dining Cryptographers
Networks (DC-nets) leave groups vulnerable to denial-of-service and Sybil attacks, mix net-
works are difficult to protect against traffic analysis, and accountable voting schemes are un-
suited to general anonymous messaging.
DISSENT is the first general protocol offering provable anonymity and accountability for
moderate-size groups, while efficiently handling unbalanced communication demands among
users. We present an improved and hardened DISSENT protocol, define its precise security
properties, and offer rigorous proofs of these properties. The improved protocol systematically
addresses the delicate balance between provably hiding the identities of well-behaved users,
while provably revealing the identities of disruptive users, a challenging task because many
forms of misbehavior are inherently undetectable. The new protocol also addresses several
non-trivial attacks on the original DISSENT protocol stemming from subtle design flaws.
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1 Introduction
Anonymous participation is often considered a basic right in free societies (Yale Law Journal 1961).
The limited form of anonymity the Internet provides is a widely cherished feature enabling people
and groups with controversial or unpopular views to communicate and organize without fear of per-
sonal reprisal.Yet anonymity makes it difficult to trace or exclude misbehaving participants. Online
protocols providing stronger anonymity, such as mix-networks (Chaum 1981; Adida 2006), onion
routing (Goldschlag, Reed, and Syverson 1999; Dingledine, Mathewson, and Syverson 2004), and
Dining Cryptographers Networks or DC-nets (Chaum 1988; Waidner and Pfitzmann 1989a; Sirer,
Goel, Robson, and Engin 2004; Golle and Juels 2004), further weaken accountability, yielding fo-
rums in which no content may be considered trustworthy and no reliable defense is available against
anonymous misbehavior.
DISSENT (Dining-cryptographers Shuffled-Send Network) is a communication protocol that
provides strong integrity, accountability, and anonymity, within a well-defined group of participants
whose membership is closed and known to its members (Corrigan-Gibbs and Ford 2010). DISSENT
enables members of such a group to send anonymous messages – either to each other, to the whole
group, or to a non-member – such that the receiver knows that some member sent the message, but
no one knows which member. DISSENT also holds members accountable – not by compromising
their anonymity, but rather by ensuring that communication resources are allocated fairly among
all communicating members, and that any disruption results in the identification of some malicious
member during a “blame” process. Misbehaving members are thus unable to corrupt or block other
members’ messages, overrun the group with spam, stuff ballots, or create unlimited anonymous
Sybil identities (Douceur 2002) or sock puppets (Stone and Richtel 2007) with which to bias or
subvert a group’s deliberations.
DISSENT builds on the sender-verifiable shuffle of Brickell and Shmatikov (2006), combining
a similar shuffle scheme with DC-net techniques for efficient bulk communication. DISSENT uses
only readily available cryptographic primitives and handles arbitrarily large messages and unbal-
anced loads efficiently. Each member sends exactly one message per round, making it usable for
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voting or assigning pseudonyms with a 1-to-1 correspondence to real group members. DISSENT
has limitations, of course. It is not intended for large-scale, “open-access” anonymous messaging
or file sharing (Goldschlag, Reed, and Syverson 1999; Clarke, Sandberg, Wiley, and Hong 2000).
DISSENT’s accountability property assumes closed groups, and may be ineffective if a malicious
member can leave and rejoin the group under a new (public) identity. Finally, DISSENT’s serial-
ized GMP-SHUFFLE protocol imposes a per-round startup delay that makes DISSENT impractical for
latency-sensitive applications. Further discussion on related anonymous communication systems is
included in Section 2.
DISSENT was introduced by Corrigan-Gibbs and Ford (2010), who sketched the basic protocol
and informal security arguments, described practical usage considerations, and experimentally eval-
uated the performance of a prototype implementation. This paper revisits and substantially modifies
the DISSENT protocol, to offer a precise formal definition and exposition of the protocol and a rig-
orous analysis of its security properties. Though the overall structure and function remains similar,
the new protocol re-formulates and heavily revises the original to address flaws our formal analy-
sis revealed, and to provide a modular framework for defining and rigorously reasoning about the
DISSENT protocol’s nontrivial composition of verifiable shuffle and DC-nets techniques. While our
primary focus is on hardening the DISSENT protocol through rigorous formal analysis, some of the
techniques we develop may be of independent interest, such as our methods of modular reasoning
and ensuring accountability throughout complex protocols, including capabilities to identify and
prove the source of any disruption attempt without compromising other security properties.
For this improved protocol we are able to offer proofs of all three key security properties: in-
tegrity, accountability, and anonymity. Obtaining a provably secure protocol required a surprising
amount of additional work given the relative simplicity and maturity of the underlying ideas. How-
ever, as observed by Wikstro¨m (2004), the complexity of anonymous communication protocols has
frequently resulted in incomplete proofs and subtle errors (see further discussion in Section 2). Sec-
tion 3.4 discusses in greater detail the discovered flaws and the resulting changes to the protocol.
The main contributions of this paper, therefore, are (1) we provide a full description of an
improved and hardened DISSENT protocol, (2) we present precise formal definitions of its security
properties, and (3) we give rigorous proofs that the protocol satisfies those definitions.
Section 3 outlines DISSENT’s framework, Section 4 defines the security model and DISSENT’s
properties, and Section 5 lists the technical preliminaries. Sections 6 and 7 describe the GMP-
SHUFFLE protocol and the GMP-BULK transfer protocol respectively. Section 8 provides formal
proofs of the security properties. Section 2 summarizes related work, and Section 9 concludes.
2 Related Work
DISSENT’s shuffle protocol builds on an anonymous data collection protocol by Brickell and Shmatikov
(2006), adding accountability via new go/no-go and blame phases. DISSENT’s bulk protocol is in-
spired by DC-nets (Chaum 1988), an information coding approach to anonymity.
DC-nets traditionally require nondeterministic “reservation” schemes to allocate the anony-
mous channel’s communication bandwidth, however, and are difficult to protect against anonymous
DoS attacks by malicious group members. Strategies exist to strengthen DC-nets against DoS at-
tacks (Waidner and Pfitzmann 1989b; Golle and Juels 2004), or to form new groups when an attack
is detected (Sirer, Goel, Robson, and Engin 2004). DISSENT’s use of a shuffle protocol to set up a
deterministic DC-nets instance, however, cleanly avoids these DoS vulnerabilities while providing
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the additional guarantee that each member sends exactly one message per protocol run, a useful
property for holding votes or assigning 1-to-1 pseudonyms.
Mix networks (Chaum 1981) offer high-latency but practical anonymous communication, and
can be adapted to group broadcast (Perng, Reiter, and Wang 2006). Unfortunately, for many mix-
network designs, anonymity is vulnerable to traffic analysis (Serjantov, Dingledine, and Syverson
2003) and performance is vulnerable to active disruption (Dingledine and Syverson 2002; Iwanik,
Klonowski, and Kutylowski 2004). Cryptographically-verifiable mixes (Neff 2001; Furukawa and
Sako 2001; Adida 2006) are a possible solution to disruption attacks and a potential alternative to
our shuffle protocol. However, verifiable shuffles alone generally verify only a shuffle’s correctness
(i.e., that it is a permutation), and not its randomness (i.e., that it ensures anonymity). All existing
techniques of which we are aware to assure a shuffle’s randomness and anonymity, in the presence
of compromised members, require passing a batch of messages through a series of independent
shuffles, as in DISSENT or mix-networks (Dingledine, Shmatikov, and Syverson 2004).
Low-latency designs can provide fast and efficient communication supporting a wide variety of
applications, but they typically provide much weaker anonymity than DISSENT. For example, onion
routing (Goldschlag, Reed, and Syverson 1999; Dingledine, Mathewson, and Syverson 2004), a
well-known and practical approach to general anonymous communication on the Internet, is vul-
nerable to traffic analysis by adversaries who can observe streams going into and out of the net-
work (Syverson, Tsudik, Reed, and Landwehr 2000). Similarly, Crowds (Reiter and Rubin 1999)
is vulnerable to statistical traffic analysis when an attacker can monitor many points across the net-
work. Herbivore (Goel, Robson, Polte, and Sirer 2003) provides unconditional anonymity, but only
within a small subgroup of all participants. k-anonymous transmission protocols (von Ahn, Bortz,
and Hopper 2003) provide anonymity only when most members of a group are honest.
We thus observe tradeoffs among security, efficiency, and possible applications. Further, many
cryptographic attacks have been discovered against specific anonymity protocols. These protocols
are often complex and contain subtle flaws in design, security proofs, or security definitions. For
example, many attacks have been identified against mix-network schemes, some against schemes
that offered proofs of security. A simple yet powerful attack against one scheme (Park, Itoh, and
Kurosawa 1994) trivially breaks an honest member’s anonymity if an attacker can create a cipher-
text related to that member’s ciphertext (Pfitzmann 1994; Pfitzmann and Pfizmann 1990). An attack
on the integrity of a scheme claimed to be probably secure (Jakobsson 1998) was given by Mitomo
and Kurosawa (2000). A corrupted mix server can alter intermediate ciphertexts, affecting the cor-
responding output messages, without being detected later on. Several attacks on the anonymity and
robustness of another scheme (Golle, Zhong, Boneh, Jakobsson, and Juels 2002) claimed secure
were presented by Wikstro¨m (2003). These attacks frequently exploited previously identified gen-
eral design flaws (Pfitzmann and Pfizmann 1990; Pfitzmann 1994; Desmedt and Kurosawa 2000)
(Pfitzmann 1994; Desmedt and Kurosawa 2000) as well as the ability of mix servers to use incorrect
and specially-prepared inputs. Abe and Imai (2003) described two anonymity attacks on mix-net
designs (Jakobsson and Juels 2001; Golle, Zhong, Boneh, Jakobsson, and Juels 2002), possible
when members collude with a server and even with completely-honest mix servers and later on
pointed out (Abe and Imai 2006) that some flaws are related to weak security definitions. Even
newly proposed schemes still succumb to previous attacks. A recent work of Khazaei, Terelius, and
Wikstro¨m (2012) points out flaws in the design of Allepuz and Castello (2010) that facilitate attacks
against anonymity and integrity, some of which are based on previously-described attacks (Pfitz-
mann 1994).
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Finally, there are several ways in which anonymity protocols have provided some notion of
accountability. In general, they may offer accountability either for protocol violations or for unde-
sirable content or behavior (Feigenbaum, Hendler, Jaggard, Weitzner, and Wright 2011). DISSENT
and other protocols based on DC-nets (Waidner and Pfitzmann 1989a; Golle and Juels 2004), and
verifiable shuffles (Neff 2003; Khazaei, Moran, and Wikstro¨m 2012; Bayer and Groth 2012) aim
to hold users accountable for protocol violations. Each client remains anonymous unless he mis-
behaves by breaking the rules of the protocol. In contrast, some other anonymity protocols (von
Ahn, Bortz, Hopper, and ONeill 2006; Diaz and Preneel 2007; Backes, Clark, Kate, Simeonovski,
and Druschel 2014) attempt to unmask a client’s identity if the client’s actions or the contents of his
messages are unacceptable or unpopular, when a set of explicitly or implicitly defined parties agrees
to.
3 Informal Protocol Overview
DISSENT is designed to be used in a group setting. Each member i of a group is associated with a
long-term public signature key pair (ui, vi), where ui is the private signing key and vi is the public
verification key. We assume the signature key pair represents each member’s public identity, and
that members cannot easily obtain such identities. This assumption makes DISSENT’s accountabil-
ity property enforceable, so that an exposed misbehaving member cannot trivially leave and rejoin
the group under a new (public) identity. Members can obtain such identities from trusted certifi-
cation authorities, or agree among themselves on a static set of group members and corresponding
signature keys. Specific approaches to group formulation, however, are out of scope of this paper.
DISSENT provides a shuffled send communication primitive that ensures sender anonymity
among the group. During each protocol run, every group member i secretly creates a message mi
and submits it to the protocol. The protocol effectively collects all secret messages, shuffles their
order according to some random permutation pi that no one knows, and broadcasts the resulting
sequence of messages to all members. Each input message mi can have a different length Li.
We present a messaging interface, called the General Messaging Protocol, that DISSENT im-
plements. DISSENT in fact defines two protocols implementing this interface: the GMP-SHUFFLE
protocol provides anonymous communication for fixed-length messages, and the GMP-BULK pro-
tocol builds on this to provide efficient anonymous communication of arbitrary-length messages.
3.1 The General Messaging Protocol
A Group Messaging Protocol GMP is a 3-tuple of the following algorithms: SETUP(vi),
ANONYMIZE(mi,K, nR, τ, kh, fi) and VERIFY-PROOF(pj , `i). All group members collectively run
the SETUP and ANONYMIZE algorithms on their own inputs, while anyone, including users other
than group members, can independently run the VERIFY-PROOF algorithm.
SETUP takes a member’s public verification key vi as input and outputs one or more session
nonces nR, a set K of all members’ verification keys, a well-known ordering of members τ , a hash
key kh and optionally a message length L. All group members run the SETUP algorithm before
each protocol run to agree on common parameters. Such agreement might be achieved via Paxos
(Lamport 1998) or BFT (Castro and Liskov 1999). We emphasize that SETUP does not generate
members’ signature key pairs or create a binding between a user’s identity and his signature key pair;
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rather, it uses long-term verification keys submitted by each member and allows group members to
agree on the set K of verification keys for a particular protocol run.
ANONYMIZE takes a message mi, a set K of members’ verification keys, one or more round
nonces nR, an ordering of members τ , a hash key kh, and optionally a flag fi as input, and outputs
either (SUCCESS,M ′i), where M
′
i is a set of messages, or (FAILURE, BLAMEi, `i), where BLAMEi
is a set of observed misbehaviors, and `i is a log of a protocol run. The goal of ANONYMIZE is to
broadcast anonymously the set of messages submitted by group members. If a protocol run succeeds
from a given member’s perspective, then she outputs the anonymized messages. Otherwise, the
protocol run fails and the group member produces a set of blame proofs that verifiably reveal at
least one misbehaving member responsible for causing the failure. In the security properties to be
defined below we will demand that ANONYMIZE always either succeeds completely or produces a
valid blame proof on failure; this guarantee of accountability is both one of DISSENT’s key points
of novelty and the source of some of the most difficult technical challenges this paper addresses.
VERIFY-PROOF takes a proof pj of a member j’s misbehavior and a log `i as input, and outputs
either TRUE if pj indeed proves that j misbehaved given the protocol history represented by log `i,
or FALSE otherwise. Any third party can use VERIFY-PROOF to check a proof of j’s misbehavior.
3.2 The GMP-Shuffle Protocol
The GMP-SHUFFLE protocol enables the anonymous exchange of equally sized messages. However,
it incurs extra communication if only one member wishes to send, and its decrypt-and-shuffle phase
is inherently serial. GMP-SHUFFLE builds on a data mining protocol by Brickell and Shmatikov (Brick-
ell and Shmatikov 2006) to broadcast the input set of messages, one from each group member,
providing cryptographically strong anonymity. Like many anonymous messaging protocols, the
original data mining protocol was vulnerable to untraceable denial-of-service (DoS) attacks by ma-
licious group members. We remove this vulnerability by adding go/no-go and blame phases, which
can trace and hold accountable any group member disrupting the protocol.
GMP-SHUFFLE consists of three algorithms: SETUP-S, ANONYMIZE-S, and VERIFY-PROOF-S.
All group members run SETUP-S to agree on common parameters for ANONYMIZE-S. During
ANONYMIZE-S, members first establish ephemeral inner and outer encryption keys, then each mem-
ber doubly onion-encrypts his secret message using the inner and outer public keys of all members.
After collectively shuffling all encrypted messages and removing the outer layers of encryption,
members verify that the resulting set includes each member’s inner encryption of their message and
no member observed any failures thus far. If all steps are performed correctly, members reveal their
inner private keys, allowing each member to recover the full set of secret messages and successfully
complete the protocol. However, if any member observes misbehavior at any step of the protocol,
the protocol fails for that member. Following a failure, members perform a blame procedure whose
goal is to identify at least one culprit member and to produce a verifiable proof of his misbehavior.
To facilitate the blame process, all members always exchange their protocol logs, and those who did
not reveal their inner private keys share their outer private keys, allowing each member to trace the
protocol’s execution. Although members reveal full logs, each member’s anonymity is protected
since honest members never reveal both private keys. Therefore, a member can always perform the
blame procedure and produce proofs of misbehavior regardless of how the protocol completed for
other members. Afterwards, anyone can run VERIFY-PROOF-S to validate purported proof(s) of any
member’s misbehavior in ANONYMIZE-S.
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Section 6 details the GMP-SHUFFLE protocol and Section 8 proves its security.
3.3 The GMP-Bulk Protocol
The GMP-BULK protocol uses ideas from DC-nets to transmit variable-length messages anony-
mously, but leverages the GMP-SHUFFLE protocol to prearrange the DC-nets transmission schedule,
guaranteeing each member exactly one message slot per round. GMP-BULK also reuses GMP-SHUFFLE
to broadcast anonymous accusations, to blame a culprit who may have caused a protocol failure.
Like GMP-SHUFFLE, GMP-BULK consists of three algorithms, SETUP-B, ANONYMIZE-B, and
VERIFY-PROOF-B. All members use SETUP-B to agree on common parameters for any given pro-
tocol round and VERIFY-PROOF-B to verify proofs of misbehavior produced in ANONYMIZE-B.
During ANONYMIZE-B, each member creates and anonymously broadcasts via ANONYMIZE-S a
message descriptor, which defines pseudorandom sequences all other members must send in a sub-
sequent DC-nets exchange, such that XORing all sequences together yields a permuted set of secret
messages. Cryptographic hashes in the message descriptors enable members to verify the correct-
ness of each others’ bulk transmissions, ensuring message integrity and accountability throughout.
A successful protocol run allows a member to recover all secret messages of honest members. If
any member observes a failure at any step, however, he prepares and shares with other members an
accusation naming the culprit member. All members, including those who did not observe any fail-
ures, participate in the blame phase to give each member an opportunity to broadcast an anonymous
accusation via ANONYMIZE-S (anonymity is needed because some accusations can only be formed
by the owner of a corrupted message) and distribute evidence to support the accusation. After vali-
dating accusations, members who experienced failures perform the blame procedure to find at least
one faulty member and produce a proof of his misbehavior, exposing the culprit member.
The GMP-BULK protocol is detailed in Section 7 and Section 8 proves its security.
3.4 Comparison to the Original DISSENT Protocol
In analyzing the original DISSENT protocol we identified several attacks, which this paper fixes.
Anonymity could be broken by replaying protocol inputs in subsequent rounds, by providing in-
correct ciphertexts to some members at certain points and correct ones to the rest, or by copying
ciphertexts at other points. Accountability for disruption could be avoided by copying protocol
inputs from honest members, and dishonest members could falsely accuse honest ones by rearrang-
ing valid signed messages to create phony logs. Finally, through equivocation a dishonest member
could cause some honest members to terminate successfully and skip the blame process, while other
honest members observe failure but are unable to terminate the protocol with a valid blame proof.
See the appendix for more details of these attacks, pointing out classes of subtle flaws that may
affect other protocols as well.
To fix these flaws, we made several non-trivial modifications to the original protocol. To prevent
replay attacks we added key generation steps (GMP-SHUFFLE Phase 1 and GMP-BULK Phases 1a
and 1b). To prevent equivocation attacks, where a member sends different versions of a message
instead of broadcasting it to all members, we added rebroadcast steps (GMP-BULK Phase 5), and
have members intentionally cause intermediate protocol failures (GMP-BULK Phases 3 and 7) when
equivocation is observed. We add non-malleable commitments (GMP-SHUFFLE Phases 2a and 2b)
to prevent submission duplication, and we add phase numbers to prevent log forgery. Finally, to
7
prevent non-termination of the protocol, we make all steps non-optional, in particular including an
opportunity for blame at the end of every execution to ensure accountability.
The protocol changes result add a communication overhead of four broadcasts to GMP-SHUFFLE.
For GMP-BULK, the overhead is four broadcasts plus the messages exchanged as a part of ANONYMIZE-A
in Phase 7, which is now non-optional. The most significant cost in practice comes from always
running ANONYMIZE-S in GMP-BULK Phase 7, due to its serialized structure, which we found to be
dominant in related experiments (Corrigan-Gibbs, Wolinsky, and Ford 2013).
4 Security Model and Definitions
We model the adversary with a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine A. We allow him to
control a fixed subset of k group members. We call the members that he controls dishonest and
the members that he does not control honest. We suppose that the members communicate using
non-private but authenticated channels. That is, a message that appears to i to be from member j is
guaranteed to be from j, but the adversary can observe all such messages when they are sent. We
also give the adversary access to member outputs.
The security properties we wish the protocol to satisfy are integrity, accountability, and anonymity.
The definitions we give of these are precise versions of the notions used by Corrigan-Gibbs and Ford
(2010). We express these properties as games between the adversary A and a challenger C or C(b),
where b ∈ {0, 1} will be a hidden bit input to algorithm C. We denote the adversary’s output
from this game with AC . For all games, C executes the protocol with A by running the protocol
algorithm for each honest member and allowing A to act as the dishonest members. When any
message is sent from an honest member, C also sends a copy of the message with its source and
destination to A. C also sends protocol outputs of honest members to the adversary. Our definitions
are round-based and allow the adversary to execute arbitrary sequential executions of the protocol.
There is an implicit initial step of all games in which the challenger generates long-term signature
key pairs (ui, vi) for each honest member i. In general, our definitions require that the adversary
“win” the security games with negligible probability, that is, with probability that goes to zero with
the security parameter asymptotically faster than any inverse polynomial. Output probabilities are
taken over the randomness of both the adversary and challenger.
The integrity game for protocol GMP is as follows:
1. As many times as A requests, C takes message inputs for the honest members from A and
uses them to execute GMP with A.
2. A and C execute a challenge run of GMP for which C takes message inputs for the honest
members from A.
3. C outputs 1 if, at any time after the start of the challenge round, (i) an honest member i outputs
(SUCCESS,M ′i) such that M
′
i does not contain exactly N messages or does not include the
multiset of input messages from the honest members, or (ii) two honest members i and j
produce outputs (SUCCESS,M ′i) and (SUCCESS,M
′





messages or contain a different ordering of the messages. Otherwise, once all honest members
complete, C outputs 0.
Definition 1. A protocol offers integrity if the challenger output in the integrity game is 1 with
negligible probability.
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The accountability game for protocol GMP is as follows:
1. As many times as A requests, C takes message inputs for the honest members from A and
uses them to execute GMP with A.
2. A and C execute a challenge run of GMP for which C takes message inputs for the honest
members from A.
3. As many times as A requests, C takes message inputs for the honest members from A and
uses them to execute GMP with A.
4. C outputs 1 if (i) at the end of the challenge run an honest member i produces an output
of (FAILURE, BLAMEi, `i), where BLAMEi is empty or contains pj ∈ BLAMEi such that
VERIFY-PROOF(pj , `i) 6= TRUE, or (ii) at any time after the challenge run starts A sends C
(FAILURE, BLAMEi, `i) such that pj ∈ BLAMEi for honest j, VERIFY-PROOF(pj , `i) = TRUE,
and the output of SETUP in `i includes the nonce of the challenge round and assigns the long-
term verification key vj to j. Otherwise C outputs 0 once all protocol runs are completed.
Definition 2. A protocol offers accountability if the challenger output in the accountability game is
1 with negligible probability.
We use the anonymity game described by Brickell and Shmatikov (2006). Note that this definition
will only make sense for an adversary of size 0 ≤ k ≤ N − 2.
1. As many times as A requests, C(b) takes message inputs for the honest members from A and
uses them to execute the protocol with A.
2. A chooses two honest participants α and β and two message inputs mc0 and m
c
1. He also
chooses message inputs mh for each honest member h /∈ {α, β} and sends them to C(b).
3. C(b) assigns mα = mcb and mβ = m
c
1−b.
4. A and C(b) execute the protocol.
5. As many times as A requests, C(b) takes message inputs for the honest members from A and
uses them to execute the protocol with A.
6. The adversary outputs a guess bˆ ∈ {0, 1} for the value of b.
The adversary’s advantage in the anonymity game is equal to
∣∣Pr [AC(0) = 1]− Pr [AC(1) = 1]∣∣.
Definition 3. A protocol maintains anonymity if the advantage in the anonymity game is negligible.
We note that this definition implies anonymity among all honest users and not just pairs, be-
cause for any pair of assignments of honest messages to honest users, we can turn one assignment
into the other via a sequence of pairwise swaps, each of which are guaranteed by the definition to
change the adversary’s output distribution by a negligible amount. We observe that these properties
do not imply that the protocol completes for all members, and, in fact, we cannot guarantee that
DISSENT terminates if a member stops participating at some point. However, the protocol execu-
tion is very simple: a fixed sequence of phases during which all members send no message or all
send one message. If a properly signed message indicating the desired protocol run and phase is
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received from every member, the protocol proceeds to the next round. Therefore every member
knows when another should send a message, and thus gossip techniques such as those used in Peer-
Review (Haeberlen, Kouznetsov, and Druschel 2007) should be applicable via a wrapper protocol
to ensure liveness. Moreover, we note that when every member follows the protocol, not only does
it complete but it succeeds.
5 Technical Preliminaries
5.1 Definitions
Member i broadcasts a message by sending it to all other members. A dishonest member might
equivocate during a broadcast by sending different messages to different members. A run of GMP
succeeds for member i if the ANONYMIZE algorithm terminates with output (SUCCESS,M ′i), and it
fails if the ANONYMIZE algorithm terminates with output (FAILURE, BLAMEi, `i).
5.2 Cryptographic Primitives and Security Assumptions
DISSENT makes use of several cryptographic tools, and its security depends on certain assumptions
about their security.
5.2.1 Hash functions
We use a standard definition (Stinson 2005) of a keyed hash function and will denote the hash
of message m using key kh as HASHkh{m}. We assume that the hash function used is collision
resistant (Rogaway and Shrimpton 2004).
Definition 4. A hash function is collision resistant if it is computationally infeasible to find any two
inputs with the same hash value, i.e. to find x′ 6= x such that h(x) = h(x′).
5.2.2 Encryption
We use a cryptosystem that consists of: (i) a key generation algorithm taking a security parameter
ρ and producing a private/public key pair (x, y); (ii) an encryption algorithm taking public key y,
plaintext m, and some random bits R, and producing a ciphertext c = {m}Ry ; (iii) a deterministic
decryption algorithm taking private key x and ciphertext c, and returning the plaintextm. A member
can save the random bits R used during encryption. The notation c = {m}R1:RNy1:yN indicates iterated
encryption via multiple keys: c = {. . . {m}R1y1 . . . }RNyN . We omit R when an encryption’s random
inputs need not be saved.We assume that the underlying public-key cryptosystem provides indistin-
guishable ciphertexts against a chosen-ciphertext attack, that is, that the cryptosystem is IND-CCA2
secure (Bellare, Desai, Pointcheval, and Rogaway 1998). We also assume that members can check
an arbitrary (x, y) purported to be a key pair to verify that it could have been generated by the
specified key generation algorithm. We describe a ciphertext as invalid when it can be recognized
with no private information that decryption would result in an error. This includes as an important
special case the value ⊥, which is the output upon a decryption error.
Definition 5. A cryptosystem is IND-CCA2 if, for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries, the
advantage in the distinguishing game is negligible as a function of the security parameter ρ.
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The distinguishing game (Bellare, Desai, Pointcheval, and Rogaway 1998; Brickell and Shmatikov
2006) is played between an adversary A and a challenger C who takes as input the challenge bit b.
1. The challenger C uses ρ to generate a key pair (x, y) and gives the public key y to the adver-
sary A.
2. A may encrypt polynomially many messages m using y and decrypt polynomially many
arbitrary ciphertexts c. To decrypt a ciphertext c = {m}y, A queries c to C, who sends back
m = {c}x.
3. Eventually, A chooses two messages m0 and m1 and sends them to C.
4. C computes cb = {mb}y and sends it to A.
5. A may perform polynomially many encryptions of any m, and polynomially many decryp-
tions of any ciphertexts c, provided that c 6= cb.
6. A outputs a guess bˆ ∈ {0, 1} for the value of b.
The adversary’s advantage in the distinguishing game is equal to∣∣∣Pr [AC(0) = 1]− Pr [AC(1) = 1]∣∣∣ ,
where the probability is taken over the randomness of the adversary and the challenger.
5.2.3 Digital Signatures
We use a signature scheme that consists of: (i) a key generation algorithm taking a security param-
eter ρ and producing a private/public key pair (u, v); (ii) a signing algorithm taking private key u
and message m to produce signature σ = SIGu{m}; and (iii) a deterministic verification algorithm
taking public key v, message m, and candidate signature σ, and returning true if σ is a correct
signature of m using v’s associated private key u. The notation {m}SIGu indicates the concate-
nation of message m with the signature SIGu{m}.We assume that the underlying digital signature
scheme provides existential unforgeability under an adaptive chosen message attack, that is, that it
is EUF-CMA secure (Goldwasser, Micali, and Rivest 1995).
Definition 6. A digital signing scheme is EUF-CMA secure if, for all probabilistic polynomial-time
adversaries, the adversary’s advantage in the forging game is negligible as a function of the security
parameter ρ.
The forging game is played between an adversary A and a challenger C. It is equivalent to a
standard EUF-CMA game.
1. The challenger C uses ρ to generate a key pair (x, y) and gives the public key y to the adver-
sary A.
2. A may request signatures on polynomially many messages. A chooses a message m and
sends it to C, who sends back σ, a signature on m under y. A is allowed to query C in an
adaptive fashion.
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3. Eventually, A outputs a pair (m′, σ′).
The adversary wins the forging game if (m′, σ′) is a valid message- signature pair under y
assuming that m′ has never been queried to the challenger. The adversary’s advantage is simply the
probability of winning the forging game, where the probability is taken over the randomness of the
adversary and the challenger.
5.2.4 Pseudo-random Number Generator
We use a standard definition (Stinson 2005) of a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG). Let
g(s) be a pseudo-random number generator, where s is a seed. We will denote the first L bits
generated from g(s) as PRNG{L, s}.
Definition 7. A function g : {0, 1}`1(ρ) → {0, 1}`2(ρ) is a pseudorandom number generator if, for
all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries, the adversary’s advantage in the pseudorandomness
game is negligible as a function of the security parameter ρ.
The pseudorandomness game is played between an adversary A and a challenger C(b).
1. If b = 0, C chooses s ∈ {0, 1}`1(ρ) uniformly at random and sets r = g(s). If b = 1, C
chooses r ∈ {0, 1}`2(ρ) uniformly at random.
2. C sends r to A.
3. A outputs a guess bˆ ∈ {0, 1} for the value of b.
The adversary’s advantage in the pseudorandomness game is∣∣∣Pr [AC(0) = 1]− Pr [AC(1) = 1]∣∣∣ ,
where the probability is taken over the randomness of the adversary and the challenger.
5.2.5 Non-interactive Commitments
We use a non-interactive commitment that is concurrent non-malleable (Pandey, Pass, and Vaikun-
tanathan 2008). The notation x = COMMIT{c} indicates that x is a commitment to c, and the
notation c = OPEN{x} indicates that c is the opening of the commitment x. We note that minor
protocol modifications would allow interactive commitments instead.
5.2.6 SETUP Consensus
We assume that the protocol used by SETUP produces a consensus output in the presence of the
adversary. The adversary signals honest members to begin a SETUP round and can repeat with
additional rounds. Each honest member i uses verification key vi as the input. Our assumption is
that, with probability 1 for every round, honest members that terminate produce the same output and
that the output includes i) nonces never used in a previous round, ii) the key vi for honest member i
and some key for each dishonest member, and iii) a uniformly random hash key.
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6 GMP-Shuffle
The Group Messaging Protocol-Shuffle GMP-SHUFFLE is an instantiation of the Group Messaging
Protocol and consists of three algorithms: SETUP-S, ANONYMIZE-S, and VERIFY-PROOF-S.
Before each protocol run, all members run the SETUP-S algorithm to agree on the common
parameters needed for each run. One parameter thus determined is the fixed message length L. Each
member i pads or trims input message mi to length L. All members use the remaining parameters
K, nR, τ , and kh as inputs to ANONYMIZE-S. This algorithm also takes a fail flag fi which is always
set to FALSE when the algorithm is run as a part of GMP-SHUFFLE. The fail flag will sometimes
be set to TRUE when ANONYMIZE-S is run as a part of GMP-BULK. Figure 1 shows the normal
execution (solid lines) and failure-handling execution (dashed lines) of ANONYMIZE-S.
Anonymize	  by	  shuﬄing	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END:	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Figure 1: Flow of the ANONYMIZE-S algorithm
The VERIFY-PROOF-S algorithm is used to validate a proof of a member’s misbehavior produced
upon a protocol failure.
6.1 The Setup-S Algorithm
SETUP-S(vi) takes each member’s verification key vi as input and outputs a session nonce nR, a list
K of all members’ verification keys, an ordering of members τ , a fixed message length L, and a
hash key kh. As described in Section 3.1, this algorithm can be implemented using tools such as a
standard consensus protocol.
6.2 The Anonymize-S Algorithm
The purpose of ANONYMIZE-S(mi,K, nR, τ, kh, fi) when run by each member in a group on the
collective input messages M is to produce anonymized messages M ′.
A protocol run of ANONYMIZE-S succeeds for member i if an internal flag SUCCESSi is set to
TRUE after completion of ANONYMIZE-S and fails otherwise. After a successful completion of a
protocol run, member i outputs (SUCCESS,M ′i), where, as we show in Section 8, M
′
i consists of
N messages including every message submitted by an honest member. After a protocol failure,
member i produces (FAILURE, BLAMEi, `i). BLAMEi includes proofs pj = (j, c) for each member
j for whom a check c of her behavior failed in Phase 6 from i’s point of view. At least one of the
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following checks always fails for some member j from i’s point of view provided that SUCCESSi =
FALSE. In such situation a proof pj is added to BLAMEi. The checks are listed in the order they
are applied by member i during the protocol. Each check is associated with a check number that
ANONYMIZE-S uses to form a proof of a particular form of misbehavior, and VERIFY-PROOF-S uses
to confirm a record of that misbehavior.
• Check 1 (c1): Incomplete log or equivocation (different versions of messages in released
logs).
• Check 2 (c2): Mismatched inner key pair in Phase 5.
• Check 3 (c3): Empty inner private key in Phase 5 without a justifying GOk = FALSE or
broadcast-hash inequality.
• Check 4 (c4): Mismatched outer key pair or empty outer private key in Phase 6 regardless of
a GOk = FALSE message or broadcast-hash inequality.
• Check 5 (c5): Invalid public key in Phase 1.
• Check 6 (c6): Invalid commitment in Phase 2a.
• Check 7 (c7): Incorrect commitment or invalid ciphertext or identity in Phase 2b.
• Check 8 (c8): Incorrect set of permuted ciphertexts after decryption in Phase 3.
• Check 9 (c9): Invalid ciphertext(s) after decryption in Phase 3.
• Check 10 (c10): Duplicate ciphertext(s) after decryption in Phase 3.
• Check 11 (c11): Incorrect GOj in Phase 4.
• Check 12 (c12): Incorrect broadcast hash in Phase 4.
For every member i, a complete log includes messages sent and received within SETUP-S and the
following messages for each phase of ANONYMIZE-S:
• SETUP-S: All protocol messages.
• Phase 1: Sent: µi1, received: µk1 for all k 6= i.
• Phase 2a: Sent: µi2a, received: µk2a for all k 6= i.
• Phase 2b: Sent: µi2b, received: if i = 1, then µk2b for all k 6= i, if i 6= 1, then no message.
• Phase 3: Sent: µi3, received: if i = 1, then no message, if i 6= 1, then µ(i−1)3.
• Phase 4: Sent: µi4, received: µk4 for all k 6= i.
• Phase 5: Sent: µi5, received: µk5 for all k 6= i.
• Phase 6: Sent: µi6, received: µk6 for all k 6= i.
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Algorithm description. ANONYMIZE-S(mi,K, nR, τ, kh, fi)
• Phase 1: Generation of Inner and Outer Key Pairs.
Each member i chooses two ephemeral encryption key pairs (Iseci , I
pub






µi1 = {Ipubi , Opubi , nR,1, i}SIGui .
Member i verifies that the messages she receives contain valid public keys. If the verification
fails, member i sets an internal flag GOi to FALSE to indicate that a step of the protocol failed.
• Phase 2a: Data Commitment.
Each member i encrypts her datum mi with all members’ inner public keys, in reverse order
from IpubN to I
pub
1
C ′i = {mi}IpubN :Ipub1 .
Member i stores the inner ciphertext C ′i for later use, then further encrypts C
′
i with all mem-
bers’ outer public keys to obtain the outer ciphertext
Ci = {C ′i}OpubN :Opub1 .
If a public key released by some member j was invalid, i generates and uses a random key
for j to allow the protocol to go forward.
Now member i calculates a non-malleable commitment to Ci and i
Xi = COMMIT{Ci, i}
and broadcasts
µi2a = {Xi, nR,2a, i}SIGui .
Member i waits to receive such a message from every other member and then verifies that
they include valid commitments. If they do not, GOi is set to FALSE.
• Phase 2b: Data Submission.
Member i sends member 1 an opening of her commitment
µi2b = {OPEN{Xi}, nR,2b, i}SIGui .
Member 1 verifies that each µi2b successfully opensXi and that the result is a valid ciphertext
and i. If not, member 1 sets GO1 to FALSE.
• Phase 3: Anonymization.
Member 1 collects the results of opening the commitments into a vector ~C0 = (C1, . . . , CN ),
randomly permutes its elements, then strips one layer of encryption from each ciphertext
using private key Osec1 to form ~C1. Member 1 sends to member 2
µ13 = {~C1, nR,3, 1}SIGu1 .
Each member 1 < i < N in turn accepts ~Ci−1, permutes it randomly, strips one layer
of encryption using key Oseci to form ~Ci, then sends µi3 = {~Ci, nR,3, i}SIGui to member
i + 1. Member N similarly creates µN3 and broadcasts it to all members. Member i skips
decryption for any invalid ciphertext in ~Ci−1. Any member i who detects a duplicate or
invalid ciphertext in ~Ci sets GOi to FALSE.
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• Phase 4: Verification.
All members now hold ~CN , which should be a permutation of C ′1, . . . , C ′N . Each member i
verifies that her own inner ciphertext C ′i is included in ~CN and sets GOi to FALSE if not. If
fi = TRUE then member i always sets GOi = FALSE regardless of the above verification. If
fi = FALSE and the GOi flag has not yet been set to FALSE, it is now set to TRUE.
Each member i creates a vector ~B of all broadcast messages - that is, messages for which iden-
tical copies should have been delivered to all members - from prior phases: all members’ pub-
lic key messages from phase 1, all members’ commitment messages from phase 2a, and mem-
ber N ’s phase 3 message containing ~CN . Thus, ~B = (µ11, . . . , µN1, µ12a, . . . , µN2a, µN3).
Member i broadcasts
µi4 = {GOi, HASHkh{ ~B}, nR,4, i}SIGui .
• Phase 5: Key Release and Decryption.
Case 1. If member i receives GOj = TRUE and HASHkh{ ~Bj} = HASHkh{ ~Bi} from every
member j, and her GOi = TRUE, then member i destroys her copy of C ′i and broadcasts her
inner private key Iseci to all members
µi5 = {Iseci , nR,5, i}SIGui .
Upon receiving messages from every other member, member i verifies that each non-empty
inner private key Isecj is valid and corresponds to the public key I
pub
j . If member i receives
at least one empty key or if any key pair fails the verification, then i sets the internal flag
SUCCESSi to FALSE.
Otherwise, SUCCESSi is set to TRUE and member i removes the N levels of encryption from
~CN , resulting in M ′i = {m′1, . . . ,m′N}, the anonymized set of messages submitted to the
protocol.
Case 2. If member i received GOj = FALSE or HASHkh{ ~Bj} 6= HASHkh{ ~Bi} from any
member j, or her own flag GOi = FALSE, then member i destroys her inner private key Iseci ,
and sends to all members an empty string instead of her inner private key.
Member i broadcasts
µi5 = {0, nR,5, i}SIGui
and sets the internal flag SUCCESSi to FALSE.
• Phase 6: Blame.
Case 1. Member i’s SUCCESSi = TRUE. In this case, member i acknowledges a successful
completion of the protocol. Member i creates a vector ~T of all signed messages she sent and
received in Phases 1–5, and broadcasts
µi6 = {~T , nR,6, i}SIGui .
Now, member i outputs (SUCCESS,M ′i), which completes the protocol.
Case 2. Member i’s SUCCESSi = FALSE and for every member j GOj = TRUE and
HASHkh{ ~Bj} = HASHkh{ ~Bi}.
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Member i keeps her outer private key Opubi secret, and broadcasts an empty string instead of
her key and a vector ~T of all signed messages she sent and received in Phases 1–5
µi6 = {0, ~T , nR,6, i}SIGui .
Case 3. Member i’s SUCCESSi = FALSE and for any member j GOj = FALSE or HASHkh{ ~Bj} 6=
HASHkh{ ~Bi}. Member i broadcasts her outer private key Oseci , permutation pii and a vector
~T of all signed messages she sent and received in Phases 1–5
µi6 = {Oseci , pii, ~T , nR,6, i}SIGui .
Now, member i continues with the following steps if she executed Case 2 or Case 3. If
member i executed Case 1, then the protocol has completed.
Upon receiving a message µj6 from every other member j, member i inspects every log ~T
and discards any message in ~T that is not properly signed or does not have the correct round
or phase number. Then, member i verifies each member j’s ~T to ensure that it contains all
messages sent and received by j in Phases 1–5 as well as that the contents of all messages
included in ~T match the corresponding messages in the other ~T logs of other members. For
every member j whose ~T is incomplete or for whom different versions of any message µjφ
are revealed, member i sets pj = (j, c1), where c1 indicates the failed check number, and
adds pj to BLAMEi. If there is an incomplete ~T or an equivocation is observed, member i
creates a log `i of the protocol run that consists of all messages sent and received by i during
SETUP-S and ANONYMIZE-S. Then, member i outputs (FAILURE, BLAMEi, `i), which con-
cludes the protocol.
Otherwise, member i uses those messages in the ~T logs but not sent to i to complete her
view of Phases 1–5, and thus she proceeds to examine the remaining part of the protocol.
She begins by verifying the inner and outer key pairs revealed by other members. Member i
blames each member j who revealed his inner private key Isecj and for whom the verification
of his key pair (Isecj , I
pub
j ) failed in Phase 5. Member i sets pj = (j, c2) and adds pj to
BLAMEi Then, for every member j who sent an empty inner private key in Phase 5, member
i checks the GOk flags and broadcast hashes. Member i blames each member j whose inner
private key was empty if there is no GOk = FALSE or non-matching broadcast hash. Member
i sets pj = (j, c3) and adds pj to BLAMEi. For every member j who revealed his outer private
key in Phase 6, member i checks if the outer private key Osecj is valid and corresponds to the
outer public key Opubj . In addition, for every member j who sent an empty outer private key
in Phase 6, member i checks the vector ~T in µj6 of all messages sent and received by j to
verify that she justifies not sending Osecj by showing that in Phase 4 every GO=TRUE and all
broadcast hashes were the same. For every member j whose outer private key is invalid or
non-matching, or who was not justified in withholding the outer private key, member i sets
pj = (j, c4) and adds pj to BLAMEi.
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Member i continues by replaying the protocol from the perspective of every member j using
that member’s revealed messages and keys. Any member who does not follow the protocol
given the messages she receives is added to BLAMEi. More precisely, member i examines the
actions of the other members in each phase as follows:
– Sub-Phase 1: For every member j who sends an invalid public key, member i sets
pj = (j, c5) and adds pj to BLAMEi.
– Sub-Phase 2a: For every member j who sends an invalid commitment, member i sets
pj = (j, c6) and adds pj to BLAMEi.
– Sub-Phase 2b: For every member j who sends an opening that does not successfully
open her commitment or that does not result in a valid ciphertext and identity j, member
i sets pj = (j, c7) and adds pj to BLAMEi.
– Sub-Phase 3: In the case that all outer private keys are revealed and all outer private
keys correspond to the outer public keys, member i checks that every member j sends a
permutation of the decrypted valid ciphertexts and the invalid ciphertexts as contained
in Cj−1. For any member that fails this check, member i sets pj = (j, c8) and adds pj to
BLAMEi. Member i further checks that the submitted ciphertexts do not cause failures by
producing duplicate or invalid ciphertexts after decryption. If the submitted ciphertext
Cj of member j contains an invalid ciphertext after d decryptions, 1 ≤ d ≤ N , then
member i sets pj = (j, c9) and adds pj to BLAMEi. If the submitted ciphertexts Cj and
Ck of members j 6= k decrypt to the same ciphertext after d decryptions, 1 ≤ d ≤ N ,
then member i blames members j and k. Member i sets pj = (j, c10) and pk = (k, c10),
and then adds pj and pk to BLAMEi.
– Sub-Phase 4: In the case that all outer private keys are revealed and all outer private keys
correspond to the outer public keys, member i verifies that member j properly reported
GOj = FALSE based on the messages seen by j in Phases 1–3. At least one of the
following checks must have failed from j’s point of view to justify a GOj = FALSE.
∗ Sub-Sub-Phase 1: Member i verifies the validity of public keys using messages
(µ11, . . . , µN1) sent by all members.
∗ Sub-Sub-Phase 2a: Member i verifies the correctness of the submitted commit-
ments using (µ12a, . . . , µN2a).
∗ Sub-Sub-Phase 2b: (This check is done only for member 1) Member i verifies that
the commitments correspond to the ciphertexts and that the resulting ciphertexts
and identities are valid using (µ12a, . . . , µN2a) and (µ12b, . . . , µN2b).
∗ Sub-Sub-Phase 3: Member i verifies that there are no duplicate or invalid cipher-
texts sent from j using µj3.
∗ Sub-Sub-Phase 4: Member i verifies that j’s inner ciphertext C ′j is included in ~CN .
To determine C ′j , member i opens the commitment Xj and decrypts the resulting
ciphertext with each of the outer private keys.
If all of the above checks were successful and GOj = FALSE, then member i sets pj =
(j, c11) and adds pj to BLAMEi.
In addition, member i checks if the HASHkh{ ~Bj} that she received in µj4 is correctly
calculated from the broadcast messages. If not, member i sets pj = (j, c12) and adds pj
to BLAMEi.
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To conclude the protocol, member i creates a log `i consisting of the messages sent and received
during SETUP-S and ANONYMIZE-S and outputs (FAILURE, BLAMEi, `i).
6.3 Verify-Proof-S Algorithm
VERIFY-PROOF-S(pj , `i) is used to verify a member j’s misbehavior. The algorithm takes as input
a proof pj and a log `i. It should be that pj = (j, c), where j is a member’s identifier and c is
the number of a check which failed for j from i’s point of view. `i should be i’s log of a proto-
col run, including all messages sent and received by member i in SETUP-S and ANONYMIZE-S.




• Step 1: Proof verification. Verify that pj = (j, c), where c is a valid check number and j is a
valid member identifier. If so, then proceed to the next phase. Otherwise, output FALSE and
stop.
• Step 2: Log verification. All messages included in log `i are verified to ensure that signatures
on the included messages are valid. Each message is checked to verify that it contains a cor-
rect round nonce given the execution of the SETUP-S algorithm and a correct phase number.
All messages with invalid signatures, round nonces or phase numbers are discarded. If the
resulting log does not include all messages that were supposed to have been sent and received
by i during SETUP-S and ANONYMIZE-S, as described in the descriptions of those algorithms,
then output FALSE and stop.
Otherwise, verify that the logs of all sent and received messages revealed in Phase 6 by
every member j are complete and consistent. That is, for every message µj6, consider the
included vector ~T . Discard any message in ~T that is not properly signed or does not have the
correct round or phase number, and inspect every ~T to verify that it includes all messages sent
and received in Phases 1–5. Then, for every message recorded as sent by one member and
received by another, check that the contents match, and, for every message that is supposed to
be a broadcast, check that the contents of all observed copies match. If any ~T is incomplete
or inconsistent and c 6= c1, then output FALSE and stop. Otherwise, if c = c1 or all logs are
complete and consistent, then proceed to the next phase.
• Step 3: Proof verification decision.
If all ~T logs were determined to be complete and consistent, `i is augmented to contain all
Phase 1–5 messages sent and received by all members. Otherwise, c = c1, and a log `i of
just i’s perspective will be sufficient. The resulting `i is examined as follows to verify that j
failed check c:
– If c = c1, then we wish to verify that member j sent an incomplete ~T or equivocated in
the protocol.
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Using message µj6, which is either of the form {~T , nR,6, j}SIGuj , {0, ~T , nR,6, j}SIGuj
or {Osecj , pij , ~T , nR,6, j}SIGuj , depending on j’s execution of the protocol, check if ~T
contains all messages sent and received by j in Phases 1–5 such that all messages are
properly signed and include correct phase and round numbers. If it does not, then output
TRUE and stop. Otherwise, using the logs ~T in the messages µk6 of each member k, de-
termine whether there exist copies of a message µjφ that are properly signed with correct
round and phase numbers but have different contents. If such evidence of equivocation
exists, then output TRUE and stop; else output FALSE and stop.
– If c = c2, then we wish to verify that member j sent an invalid inner key pair.
Check if j sent µj5 of the form {Isecj , nR,5, j}SIGuj in Phase 5. If not, then output
FALSE and stop. If yes, then using messages µj1 = {Ipubj , Opubj , nR,1, j}SIGuj and




j is a valid key pair under the chosen encryption scheme. If
Isecj is invalid or does not match I
pub
j , then output TRUE and stop, else output FALSE
and stop.
– If c = c3, then we wish to verify that member j improperly sent an empty inner key in
Phase 5.
Check if j sent µj5 of the form {0, nR,5, i}SIGui in Phase 5. If not, then output FALSE
and stop. If so, then check each message µk4 for GOk = FALSE or a non-matching
HASHkh{ ~Bk}. If none are found, then output TRUE and stop; else output FALSE and
stop.
– If c = c4, then we wish to verify that member j sent an invalid outer key pair or
improperly sent an empty outer private key in Phase 6.
Check if j sent µj6 of the form {Osecj , ~T , nR,6, j}SIGuj in Phase 6. If so, then using
messages µj1 = {Ipubj , Opubj , nR,1, j}SIGuj and µj6, check whether Opubj and Osecj is
a valid key pair. If Osecj is invalid or does not match O
pub
j , then output TRUE and stop.
Otherwise, check if j sent µj6 of the form {0, ~T , nR,6, i}SIGui . If not, then output
FALSE and stop. If so, then check if j received a message µk4 from some member k that
included either a GOk set to FALSE or a non-matching HASHkh{ ~Bk}. If so, then output
TRUE and stop; else output FALSE and stop.
– If c = c5, then we wish to verify that member j sent an invalid public key in Phase 1.
Using µj1 = {Ipubj , Opubj , nR,1, j}SIGuj , check if Ipubj and Opubj are valid public keys.
If Ipubj or O
pub is not a valid key, then output TRUE and stop; else output FALSE and
stop.
– If c = c6, then we wish to verify that member j sent an invalid commitment in Phase
2a.
Using µj2a = {Xj , nR,2a, j}SIGuj , check whether Xj is a valid commitment. If it is
not, then output TRUE and stop; else output FALSE and stop.
– If c = c7, then we wish to verify that member j’s commitment is incorrect or results in
an incorrect ciphertext or identity.
Using µj2a = {Xj , nR,2a, j}SIGuj and µj2b = {OPEN{Xj}, nR,2b, j}SIGuj , check
whether Xj matches OPEN{Xj} and results in a valid ciphertext. If Xj does not match
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OPEN{Xj} or does not yield a valid ciphertext and identity j, then output TRUE and
stop, else output FALSE and stop.
– If c = c8, then we wish to verify that member j did not send a permutation of decrypted
ciphertexts in Phase 3.
Check if every member k sent µk6 of the form {Oseck , pik, ~T , nR,6, k}SIGuk in Phase 6.
If not, then output FALSE and stop. If so, then using µk1 = {Ipubk , Opubk , nR,1, k}SIGuk
and µk6, check if each member’s outer keys Oseck and O
pub
k are valid and matching.
If not, then output FALSE and stop. If so, then, using µ(j−1)3 = {~Cj−1, nR,3, j −
1}SIGuj−1 , µj3 = {~Cj , nR,3, j}SIGuj , and µj6, check whether ~Cj is a permutation
of decrypted ciphertexts. That is, using pij , permute the elements of the vector ~Cj−1
included in µ(j−1)3, then decrypt each valid ciphertext using Osecj and verify whether
the resulting vector matches the vector in µj3. If they do not match, then output TRUE
and stop, else output FALSE and stop.
– If c = c9, then we wish to verify that member j’s decrypted outer ciphertext Cj results
in an invalid ciphertext.
Check if every member k sent µk6 of the form {Oseck , pik, ~T , nR,6, k}SIGuk in Phase 6.
If not, then output FALSE and stop. If so, then using µk1 = {Ipubk , Opubk , nR,1, k}SIGuk
and µk6, check if each member’s outer keys Oseck and O
pub
k are valid and matching. If
not, then output FALSE and stop. If so, then using µj2b = {OPEN{Xj}, nR,2b, j}SIGuj ,
produce ciphertext Cj . Then use the outer private keys to iteratively remove the layers
of encryption from the ciphertexts in Cj , verifying that a valid ciphertext is produced
after every step. If at any point an invalid ciphertext is produced, then output TRUE and
stop, else output FALSE and stop.
– If c = c10, then we wish to verify that member j’s decrypted outer ciphertext Cj results
in a duplicate ciphertext.
Check if every member sent µk6 of the form {Oseck , pik, ~T , nR,6, k}SIGuk in Phase 6. If
not, then output FALSE and stop. If so, then using µk1 = {Ipubk , Opubk , nR,1, k}SIGuk
and µk6, check if each member’s outer keys Oseck and O
pub
k are valid and matching. If
not, then output FALSE and stop. If so, then using the
µk2b = {OPEN{Xk}, nR,2b, k}SIGuk of every member k, produce the submitted ci-
phertexts Ck. Use the outer private keys to iteratively remove the layers of encryption
from the valid ciphertexts in each Ck, and if at any point the result for Cj is the same as
the result for some other Ck, then output TRUE and stop, else output FALSE and stop.
– If c = c11, then we wish to verify that member j sent an incorrect GOj in Phase 4.
Check if every member sent µk6 of the form {Oseck , pik, ~T , nR,6, k}SIGuk in Phase 6. If
not, then output FALSE and stop. If so, then using µk1 = {Ipubk , Opubk , nR,1, k}SIGuk
and µk6, check if each member’s outer keys Oseck and O
pub
k are valid and matching. If
not, then output FALSE and stop. If so, then check if GOj = FALSE in µj4. If not, then
output FALSE and stop, else continue.
∗ A-S Phase 1: Using (µ11, . . . , µN1) check whether j received valid inner and outer
public keys. If any key is invalid, then output FALSE and stop.
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∗ A-S Phase 2a: Using (µ12a, . . . , µN2a) verify whether commitments (X1, . . . , XN )
are valid. If any commitment is invalid, then output FALSE and stop.
∗ A-S Phase 2b: If j = 1, then using (µ12a, . . . , µN2a) and (µ12b, . . . , µN2b) verify
whether Xk matches OPEN{Xk} and results in a valid ciphertext and identity k
for all k ∈ G. If any commitment does not properly open or results in an invalid
ciphertext or identity, then output FALSE and stop.
∗ A-S Phase 3: Using µj3, check whether the contained set of ciphertexts includes
duplicate or invalid ciphertexts. If there is an invalid or duplicate ciphertext, then
output FALSE and stop.
∗ A-S Phase 4: Using µj2b, (µ16, . . . , µN6), and µN3 verify whether j’s inner cipher-
text C ′j was included in ~CN . To determine C
′
j , open the commitment Xj included
in µj2b and decrypt the resulting ciphertext with each of the outer private keys in-
cluded in (µ16, . . . , µN6). If the calculated C ′j was not included in CN , then output
FALSE and stop, else output TRUE and stop.
– If c = c12, then we wish to verify that j sent an incorrect HASHkh{ ~B}. Calculate
~B′ using messages (µ11, . . . , µN1, µ12a, . . . , µN2a, µN3) received by j. Then, check
whether HASHkh{ ~B′} matches the HASHkh{ ~B} included in µj4. If HASHkh{ ~B′} 6=
HASHkh{ ~B}, then output TRUE, else output FALSE.
7 GMP-Bulk
The Group Messaging Protocol-Bulk GMP-BULK is an instantiation of the Group Messaging Pro-
tocol and consists of three algorithms: SETUP-B, ANONYMIZE-B, and VERIFY-PROOF-B. Each
member i submits a messagemi of variable length Li to the ANONYMIZE-B protocol after all mem-
bers run SETUP-B to agree on common protocol run parameters. The fail flag fi is always set to
FALSE for any execution of ANONYMIZE-B. Figure 2 shows the normal execution (solid lines) and
failure-handling execution (dashed lines) of ANONYMIZE-B.
If a run of GMP-BULK completes, it can either succeed or fail. In case of a protocol failure the
VERIFY-PROOF-B protocol is used to validate the proofs of member’s misbehavior generated upon
a protocol failure.
7.1 The Setup-B Algorithm
SETUP-B(vi) takes each member’s verification key vi as input, and outputs a session nonce nR
identifying a run of ANONYMIZE-B, session nonces nR1 and nR2 identifying runs of ANONYMIZE-S
in Phase 3 and Phase 7 of ANONYMIZE-B respectively, a list K of members’ verification keys , an
ordering of members τ , and a hash key kh. Since members submit messages of variable lengths,
there is no need to agree on a fixed message length L. As described in Section 3.1, this algorithm
can be implemented using tools such as a standard consensus protocol.
7.2 The Anonymize-B Algorithm
ANONYMIZE-B(mi,K, nR, nR1 , nR2 , τ, kh) takes a messagemi of variable length L and the output
of SETUP-B as input. The algorithm operates in phases. Member i sends at most one unique message
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µiφ in phase φ. If a protocol run succeeds, then member i outputs (SUCCESS,M ′i), where, as we
show in Section 8, M ′i consists of N messages including every message submitted by an honest
member. If a protocol run fails, then member i produces (FAILURE, BLAMEi, `i). BLAMEi includes
proofs pj = (j, c) for each member j for whom a check c fails in Phase 7 from member i’s point
of view. The checks in this phase are as follows, listed in the order they are applied by member i
during the protocol. As before, each check is associated with a check number that ANONYMIZE-B
uses to form a proof of a particular form of misbehavior, and VERIFY-PROOF-B uses to confirm a
record of that misbehavior.
• Check 1 (c1): Equivocation in Phase 4 or Phase 5.
• Check 2 (c2): Failure of ANONYMIZE-S in Phase 3 or Phase 7 without justification.
• Check 3 (c3): Empty or incorrect ciphertext(s) sent in Phase 4.
• Check 4 (c4): Unverifiable proof included in the notification in Phase 4.
• Check 5 (c5): Invalid public key sent in Phase 1a.
• Check 6 (c6): Equivocation in Phase 1a.
The log `i includes all messages sent and received by i during SETUP-B and ANONYMIZE-B as well
as the output of ANONYMIZE-S in Phase 3 and Phase 7.
For every member j, a complete log `j consists of the following messages.
• SETUP-B: All protocol messages.
• Phase 1a: Sent: µj1a, received: µk1a for all k 6= j.
• Phase 1b: Sent: µj1b, received: µk1b for all k 6= j.
• Phase 2: No messages.
• Phase 3: Sent: µj3 and all messages sent in shuffle, received: µk3 for all k 6= j, and all
messages received in shuffle.
ANONYMIZE-S output: M ′j = d
′
1, . . . , d
′





ANONYMIZE-S fails as well as all messages sent and received within the protocol.
• Phase 4: Sent: µj4, received: µk4 for all k 6= j.
• Phase 5: Sent: µj5, received: µk5 for all k 6= j.
• Phase 6: No messages.
• Phase 7: Sent: µj7 and all messages sent in shuffle; received: µk7 for all k 6= j and all
messages received in shuffle.
ANONYMIZE-S output: M ′j = A
′
1, . . . , A
′





ANONYMIZE-S fails as well as all messages sent and received within the protocol.
Algorithm description. ANONYMIZE-B(mi,K, nR, nR1 , nR2 , τ, kh)
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• Phase 1a: Session Key Pair Generation.
Each member i chooses an ephemeral encryption key pair (xi, yi) and broadcasts
µi1a = {yi, nR,1a, i}SIGui .
• Phase 1b: Key Verification.
After receiving a public key from every member j, member i notifies other members about
the set of keys she receives. Member i creates ~Kei = {µ11a, . . . , µN1a} and broadcasts
µi1b = { ~Kei , nR,1b, i}SIGui .
• Phase 2: Message Descriptor Generation.
Member i creates a message descriptor di of a fixed length Λd. Member i sets Li = 0 if she
does not wish to send a message in this protocol run and Li to the desired message length if
she wishes to send a message.
Case 1. Successful key verification. Member i verifies each set of public keys received in
Phase 1b to ensure that other members received the same set of valid public keys. If every
~Kej contains the same set of public keys and every public key yj ∈ ~Kej is valid, then member
i chooses a random seed sij for each member j and generates Li pseudorandom bits from sij
to obtain ciphertext
Cij = PRNG{Li, sij} (j 6= i),
where Li and sij are of fixed lengths for all members.
Member i now XORs her message mi with each Cij for j 6= i to obtain ciphertext Cii:
Cii = Ci1 ⊕ . . .⊕ Ci(i−1) ⊕mi ⊕ Ci(i+1) ⊕ . . .⊕ CiN
Member i computes hashes Hij = HASHkh{Cij}, encrypts each seed sij with j’s public key
to form Sij = {sij}Rijyj , and collects the Hij and Sij into vectors ~Hi and ~Si:
~Hi = (Hi1, . . . ,HiN )
~Si = (Si1, . . . , SiN )
Member i forms a message descriptor di, which has a fixed length Λd
di = {Li, ~Hi, ~Si}.
Case 2. Failed key verification. If any ~Kej contains a non-matching set of keys or any ~K
e
j





Case 3. No message to send. If member i chooses not to send a message in this protocol run,
she sets Li = 0 and assigns random values to ~Hi and ~Si.
Member i forms her message descriptor di as follows and pads it to the desired length Λd
di = {Li, ~Hi, ~Si}.
• Phase 3: Message Descriptor Shuffle.
Each member i runs the ANONYMIZE-S protocol described in Section 6 using (di,K, nR1 , τ, fi)
as input, where the fixed-length descriptor di is the secret message to be shuffled. Member
i sets fi = TRUE if i created an empty message descriptor, and member i sets fi = FALSE
otherwise.
If ANONYMIZE-S succeeds, member i has a list M ′i of message descriptors in some random
permutation pi. If the protocol fails outputting (FAILURE, BLAMEs1i , `
s1




If member i set fi = TRUE, then i prepares a proof p′ of the dishonest member j’s misbehavior
to distribute to other members. If member j sent an invalid key, then member i sets p′ =
(j, c5, µj1a), where c5 indicates the failed check number and µj1a is the message received by
i in Phase 1a. If member j equivocated, then member i sets p′ = (j, c6, µj1a, µ′j1a), where
µj1a is the message received by i in Phase 1a and µ′j1a is a message included in some ~K
e
k
that contains a different key for j than in µj1a. If there is more than one culprit member j,
member i chooses one j to blame in some way that does not depend on her message (e.g.
randomly). If member i received all valid and matching keys, then member i sets p′ = 0.
Member i broadcasts:
µi3 = {p′, nR,3, i}SIGui .
• Phase 4: Data Transmission.
Case 1. If ANONYMIZE-S fails, then member j sets GOj = FALSE and shares her blame set
BLAMEs1j and log `
s1
j by broadcasting
µj4 = {GOj , BLAMEs1j , `s1j , nR,4, j}SIGuj .
Case 2. If ANONYMIZE-S succeeds, member j sets GOj = TRUE and decrypts each encrypted
seed Sij with private key xj to reveal sij . If sij matches the seed sjj that j chose for herself in
her own descriptor, then j sets Cij = Cjj . Otherwise, j sets Cij = PRNG{Li, sij}. Member
j then checks HASHkh{Cij} against Hij . If the hashes match, j sets C ′ij = Cij . If Sij is not
a valid ciphertext, sij is not a valid seed, or HASHkh{Cij} 6= Hij , then j sets C ′ij to an empty
ciphertext, C ′ij = {}.
Member j now sends each C ′ij in pi-shuffled order by broadcasting
µj4 = {GOj , C ′pi(1)j , . . . , C ′pi(N)j , nR,4, j}SIGuj .
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• Phase 5: Acknowledgment Submission.
Each member k notifies other members about the outcome of the previous phase.
Case 1. If GOj = FALSE for any member j, then member k adds each message µj4 containing
GOj = FALSE into a vector ~Vk.
Case 2. If GOj = TRUE for every member j but some ciphertext C ′ij is empty or satisfies
HASHkh{C ′ij} 6= Hij , then slot pi(i) has been corrupted. Member k adds each message µj4
containing such a corrupting ciphertext to a vector ~Vk.
Case 3. If GOj = TRUE for every member j and all ciphertexts C ′ij are non-empty and satisfy
HASHkh{C ′ij} = Hij , then member k sets ~Vk = {}.
In every case member k broadcasts
µk5 = {~Vk, nR,5, k}SIGuk .
• Phase 6: Message Recovery.
If GOi = TRUE for every member i, then for each uncorrupted slot pi(i), member k recovers
member i’s message by computing
m′i = C
′
i1 ⊕ ...⊕ C ′iN .
If ~Vk = {}, then from member k’s point of view none of the slots were corrupted and all
messagesM ′k = (m
′
1, . . . ,m
′
N ) were successfully recovered. If ~Vk 6= {}, then some message
slot was corrupted or a step of the protocol has failed.
• Phase 7: Blame.
For each member i, if i observed a corrupted slot with a descriptor matching di (there may
be more than one) and received all GOj = TRUE, then i generates an accusation naming
the member j who sent that incorrect ciphertext. If there is more than one culprit member,
member i chooses one to blame in any way that only depends on the output of ANONYMIZE-S
and on ~Vi. Each accusation has a fixed length Λa, indicates the corrupted slot pi(i), contains
the seed sij that i assigned j, and contains the random bits that i used to encrypt the seed:
Ai = {j, pi(i), sij , Rij}.
Each member i who does not have an accusation to send submits the empty accusation
Ai = 0
Λa .
These accusations will be sent anonymously using the ANONYMIZE-S protocol. However,
before running it, members look for evidence of equivocation in the previous two rounds.
Every member i compares each message µ′j4 that she received in some ~Vk in Phase 5 with
the message µj4 that she received directly from j in Phase 4. If the contents of these do not
match, ignoring any µ′j4 with an improper signature or incorrect round or phase number, then
member sets fi = TRUE to cause ANONYMIZE-S to fail in order to inform other members
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about the equivocation. If all such messages match, member i sets fi = FALSE.
Member i then runs ANONYMIZE-S(Ai,K, nR2 , τ, fi). After ANONYMIZE-S completes, there
is an opportunity for members who deliberately failed the shuffle to distribute evidence of
equivocation. For a member i who set fi = TRUE because of conflicting messages µ′j4 and
µj4, i creates a proof of j’s equivocation by setting p′ = (j, c1, µj4, µ′j4). If there is more
than one culprit member j, member i chooses one j to blame in any way that depends at most
on the broadcast messages µk4 and µk5 sent and received by i. If member i had fi = FALSE,
then i sets p′ = 0. Member i then broadcasts
µi7 = {p′, nR,7, i}SIGui .
LetOk be the output of the ANONYMIZE-S protocol for member k. After receiving a message
µi7 from every other member i, member k executes one of the following cases.





Member k sets SUCCESSk = FALSE. Then k considers every blame entry (i, c) ∈ BLAMEs2k .
If c 6= c11, then i could not have justifiably caused the blame shuffle to fail, and so k adds
(i, c2) to BLAMEk. Otherwise c = c11, and member k looks in µi7 for possible justification of
the failure. If µi7 does include two versions of the same ciphertext C ′`j (included in properly
signed messages that include correct phase and round numbers) for some member j, then k
adds (j, c1) to BLAMEk. Otherwise, k adds (i, c2) to BLAMEk.
Case 2: Ok = (SUCCESS,M
s2
k ) and ~Vk = {}.
Member k sets SUCCESSk = TRUE.
Case 3: Ok = (SUCCESS,M
s2
k ) and ~Vk includes ciphertexts.
k checks the validity of every accusation Ai = (j, pi(i), sij , Rij) in M s2k that targets an in-
correct ciphertext received by k. To do so, k replays the encryption S′ij = {sij}Rijyj , checks
that the encrypted seed Sij included in di matches S′ij , and checks that the hash Hij in di
matches HASHkh{PRNG{Li, sij}}, where Li is also obtained from di. If the accusation is
valid, then member k adds (j, c3) to BLAMEk. If M
s2
k includes no valid accusation targeting
an incorrect ciphertext received by k, then k sets SUCCESSk = TRUE. Otherwise, member k
sets SUCCESSk = FALSE.
Case 4: Ok = (SUCCESS,M
s2
k ) and ~Vk contains GOi = FALSE for some i.
Member k sets SUCCESSk = FALSE. Then k considers every GOi = FALSE in Vk.
Member k checks µi4 to see if the contained blame set and log constitute a valid proof of
some member j’s misbehavior. To do so, member k checks that `s1i contains nR1 as the
round number that is a result of SETUP-B and that VERIFY-PROOF-S(pj , `s1i ) = TRUE for
some pj ∈ BLAMEs1i . If not, then member k blames i by adding (i, c4) to BLAMEk. If
so, then k considers every pj ∈ BLAMEs1i such that VERIFY-PROOF-S(pj , `s1i ) = TRUE. If
pj 6= (j, c11), then member k adds (j, c2) to BLAMEk. If pj = (j, c11), then member k
examines µj3 to see if member j justifiably caused a failure of ANONYMIZE-S to expose bad
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Figure 2: Flow of the ANONYMIZE-B algorithm
message with correct round and phase numbers, then member k adds (`, c5) to BLAMEk. If
µj3 includes two different versions of public key y` in properly signed messages with correct
round and phase numbers, then member adds (`, c6) to BLAMEk. Otherwise, k adds (j, c2)
to BLAMEk.
In every case, k concludes as follows. If SUCCESSk = TRUE, k outputs (SUCCESS,M ′k).
Otherwise, member k creates a log `k of the protocol run that all messages sent and received
by k during SETUP-B and ANONYMIZE-B as well as the output of the ANONYMIZE-S protocol
in Phases 3 and 7. Member k outputs (FAILURE, BLAMEk, `k).
7.3 Verify-Proof-B Algorithm
The VERIFY-PROOF-B(pj , `i) algorithm is used to verify a member’s misbehavior. VERIFY-PROOF-B
takes as input a proof pj and a log `i. A proof pj should consist of a tuple (j, c), where j is a mem-
ber’s identifier and c indicates the check that failed for member j from member i’s point of view. A
log `i should include all messages sent and received during SETUP-B and ANONYMIZE-B by mem-
ber i as well as the output of ANONYMIZE-S in Phases 3 and 7. The protocol outputs TRUE if pj is
a proof of j’s misbehavior given i’s log `i and FALSE otherwise.
Algorithm description.
VERIFY-PROOF-B(pj , `i)
• Step 1: Proof verification.
Verify that pj includes a valid check number c and member identifier j. If the proof pj is
valid, then proceed to the next phase. If pj is invalid, then output FALSE and stop.
• Step 2: Log verification.
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All messages included in the log `i are verified to ensure that signatures on included messages
are valid given the included member identifier. Each message is checked to verify that it
contains a correct round nonce given the execution of the SETUP-B protocol and a correct
phase number. All messages with invalid signatures, round nonces, or phase numbers are
discarded. If the resulting log does not include all messages that were supposed to have been
sent and received by i during SETUP-B and ANONYMIZE-B, as described in the descriptions
of those algorithms, as well as the output of ANONYMIZE-S in Phases 3 and 7, then output
FALSE. Otherwise, proceed to the next phase.
• Step 3: Proof verification decision.
Log `i is examined as follows to verify that j failed check c:
– If c = c1, then we wish to verify that member j equivocated in Phase 4 or Phase 5.
Check if ANONYMIZE-S failed in Phase 7. If not, then output FALSE and stop. If yes,
then use log `s2i to check each message µk7 = {p′, nR,7, k}SIGuk . If no p′ is of the
form (j, c1, µj4, µ′j4), where µj4 and µ
′
j4 are properly signed messages with correct
round and phase numbers and are of the form {TRUE, C1, . . . , CN , nR,4, j}SIGuj for
some ciphertexts Ci, then output FALSE and stop. Else, if µj4 and µ′j4 contain different
messages for any such p′, then output TRUE and stop. Else output FALSE and stop.
– If c = c2, then we wish to verify that member j caused a failure of ANONYMIZE-S in
Phase 3 or Phase 7 without justification.
Check if either ANONYMIZE-S failed in Phase 7 or there was some µk4 in ~Vi with GOk =
FALSE. If not, then output FALSE and stop.
If ANONYMIZE-S failed in Phase 7, then consider each proof pj ∈ BLAMEs2i blaming
j. Verify that VERIFY-PROOF-S(pj , `s2i ) = TRUE and that `
s2
i uses nR2 as the round
number, and if not discard this proof. Otherwise, if pj 6= (j, c11) then output TRUE and
stop. If instead pj = (j, c11), then we must check whether j caused a protocol failure
in order to distribute a proof of equivocation of some other member k. Using message
µj7 = {p′, nR,7, j}SIGuj , check if p′ is of the form (k, c1, µk4, µ′k4) with k 6= j and
where µk4 and µ′k4 have different contents and are properly signed with correct round
and phase numbers. If not, then output TRUE and stop. If no proof results in an output
of TRUE, then output FALSE and stop.
Otherwise, the blame shuffle succeeded for i, but some member indicated a failure of
the descriptor shuffle. For every k that sent a µk4 of the form
{FALSE, BLAMEs1k , `s1k , nR,4, k}SIGuk , consider every proof pj ∈ BLAMEs1k blaming
j. Verify that VERIFY-PROOF-S(pj , `s1i ) = TRUE, and that the round number in `
s1
k is
nR1 , and if not discard this proof. Otherwise, if pj 6= (j, c11), then output TRUE and
stop. If instead pj = (j, c11), then we must check whether j caused a protocol failure
in order to distribute a proof of misbehavior of some other member k. Using message
µj3 = {p′, nR,3, j}SIGuj , check if (i) p′ is of the form (k, c5, µk1a) with k 6= j and
where µk1a contains an invalid public key yk and is properly signed with correct round
and phase numbers, or (ii) p′ is of the form (k, c6, µk1a, µ′k1a) with k 6= j and where the
keys in µk1a and µ′k1a are unequal and both messages are properly signed with correct
round and phase numbers. If not, then output TRUE and stop. If no proof pj results in
an output of TRUE, then output FALSE and stop.
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– If c = c3, then we wish to verify that member j sent an empty or incorrect ciphertext
C ′kj in Phase 4.
Check if (i) j sent µj4 of the form {TRUE, C ′pi(1)j , . . . , C ′pi(N)j , nR,4, j}SIGuj in Phase 4,
and (ii) ANONYMIZE-S in Phase 7 succeeded for member i with an accusation Ak =
{j, pi(k), skj , Rkj} naming j as a faulty member in its output. If not, then output FALSE
and stop.
Otherwise, we need to check that the accusation against j is valid. Doing so requires
comparing the accusation to the descriptors received by j. We need to be sure that j
received the descriptors claimed by i. To do so, first recompute the hash of broadcast
messages in Phases 1–3 of the descriptor shuffle and compare it to the hash that i sent in
Phase 4 of that shuffle. If the hashes are not the same, output FALSE and stop. Otherwise,
further compare them to the hash sent by j in Phase 4 of the descriptor shuffle. If they
do not match, output FALSE and stop.
Otherwise, examine the inner private keys received by i in Phase 5 of the descriptor
shuffle. If any key Iseck is invalid or does not match its public key I
pub
k , output FALSE
and stop.
Otherwise, use these keys to decrypt the inner ciphertexts contained in the final broad-
cast of Phase 3. Let {Lk, ~Hk, ~Sk} be the resulting descriptor in the slot pi(k) pointed
to by the accusation. Recall that C ′pi(k)j is the ciphertext for this slot that j sent to i in
message µj4. Check if (i) HASHkh{C ′pi(k)j} does not match the hash in the jth element
of ~Hk, (ii) the encryption of the accusation seed skj under the key sent in µj1a using
the random bits Rkj of the accusation is equal to the jth encrypted seed in ~Sk, and (iii)
HASHkh{PRNG{Lk, skj}} is equal to the hash in the jth element of ~Hk. If not, output
FALSE and stop. If so, output TRUE and stop.
– If c = c4, then we wish to verify that member j unjustifiably reported in Phase 4 a
failure of ANONYMIZE-S.
Check if j sent µj4 of the form {FALSE, BLAMEs1j , `s1j , nR,4, j}SIGuj . If not, then
output FALSE and stop. If so, examine µj3 to see if j justifiably caused failure of the
descriptor shuffle. If (i) it contains an invalid key yk in a properly signed message with
correct round and phase numbers, or (ii) it contains two different versions of the same
key yk in properly signed messages with correct round and phase numbers, then output
FALSE and stop.
Otherwise, check if (i) `s1j does not contain the round number nR1 that is the output of
SETUP-B in `i, or (ii) ∀pi ∈ BLAMEs1j VERIFY-PROOF-S(pi, `s1j ) = FALSE. If so, then
output TRUE and stop, else output FALSE and stop.
– If c = c5, then we wish to verify that member j sent an invalid key in Phase 1a.
Check if µk3 = {p′, nR,3, k}SIGuk sent by any member k contains p′ of the form
(j, c5, µj1a), where µj1a contains an invalid public key yj and is properly signed with
correct round and phase numbers. If yes, then output TRUE and stop, else output FALSE
and stop.
– If c = c6, then we wish to verify that member j equivocated in Phase 1a and sent two
different public keys.
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Check if any µk3 = {p′, nR,3, k}SIGuk contains p′ of the form (j, c6, µj1a, µ′j1a) such
that µj1a and µ′j1a have different message contents and are properly signed with correct
round and phase numbers. If yes, then output TRUE and stop, else output FALSE and
stop.
8 Proofs
In this section we prove that DISSENT satisfies the definitions of integrity, accountability, and
anonymity given in Section 4. We generally organize proofs as a sequence of games (Shoup 2004).
8.1 Notation and Definitions
LetG be the set of all members participating in the protocol, H be the set of honest members andD
the set of dishonest members. A group member i blames member j if pj ∈ BLAMEi upon a protocol
failure resulting in (FAILURE, BLAMEi, `i). This pj is a verifiable proof of j’s misbehavior given `i
if VERIFY-PROOF(pj , `i) = TRUE. We say that i exposes j if member i produces a verifiable proof
for j given a log `i in which SETUP outputs the long-term signature verification key vj for j.
8.2 Integrity
In Section 8.2.1 we provide a proof that the GMP-SHUFFLE protocol maintains integrity. Sec-
tion 8.2.2 contains a proof for the GMP-BULK protocol.
8.2.1 The GMP-Shuffle Protocol
We will show that the GMP-SHUFFLE protocol terminates either with success or failure, depending
on the outcome of the verification in Phase 4 and the key release and decryption in Phase 5. If both
phases complete successfully, then member i recovers secret messages submitted to the protocol and
the protocol completes outputting (SUCCESS,M ′i). If any step of Phase 4 or 5 fails, then member i
outputs (FAILURE, BLAMEi, `i) after executing the blame procedures in Phase 6.
Theorem 1. The GMP-SHUFFLE protocol offers integrity.
Proof. We consider the modified integrity game in which C outputs 0 upon observing a hash col-
lision. Such an observation occurs when C receives in Phase 6 different inputs to the Phase 4 hash
of broadcast messages that have the same hash value. Modifying the game in this way can only
change the probability that C outputs 1 by a negligible amount by reduction to the game defining
hash collision resistance.
For C to output 1 an honest member i must succeed during the challenge run. According
to the protocol specification, i terminated with (SUCCESS,M ′i) because (i) in Phase 4 her own
GOi = TRUE, (ii) in Phase 4 she receives messages such that GOj = TRUE and HASHkh{ ~Bj} =
HASHkh{ ~Bi} for every member j ∈ G, and (iii) in Phase 5 she received non-empty inner private
keys such that Isecj matched I
pub
j for every j ∈ G.
~Bi contains all broadcast messages member i sent and received in Phases 1–3, and thus, by (i)
and (ii) and the assumption that hash collisions are not observed, member i is in possession of the
same ~CN and inner public keys as every other honest member j. Furthermore, (iii) applies to every
31
honest j for which the protocol is successful, and so every such j has inner private keys that match
the common inner public keys.
Thus, member i can decrypt each ciphertext included in ~CN using her set of inner private keys
to obtain N messages, and the resulting list contains the same messages in the same order as each
honest user j that successfully terminates. Moreover, because member j sends i GOj = TRUE, the
inner ciphertext C ′j must be in their common ~CN . Therefore, after decryption, i obtains the message
mj of each honest member j. The probability that C outputs 1 is thus zero, which implies that the
probability that C outputs 1 in the original game is negligible.
8.2.2 The GMP-Bulk Protocol
Theorem 2. The GMP-BULK protocol offers integrity.
Proof. We consider the modified integrity game in which C outputs 0 when the shuffle in Phase 3
or 7 fails to provide integrity or when a hash collision is observed for a hash in a message descriptor.
By reduction to the integrity game with GMP-SHUFFLE and Theorem 1, the shuffles fail to provide
integrity with negligible probability. Then by reduction to the game defining collision resistance,
different ciphertexts with the same hash are seen by C with negligible probability. Thus this game
modification changes the output distribution only negligibly.
Suppose that C outputs 1. There must exist an honest member i for whom GMP-BULK ter-
minates successfully. Then, according to the protocol specification, it must be that (i) each mem-
ber k ∈ G sends i GOk = TRUE in Phase 4, (ii) the run of the ANONYMIZE-S protocol com-
pletes successfully for i in Phase 7, and (iii) either HASHkh{C ′jk} = Hjk for all ciphertexts re-
ceived by i in Phase 4 or no valid accusation is received in Phase 7 for any ciphertext such that
HASHkh{C ′jk} 6= Hjk.
Every honest member for whom the descriptor shuffle is successful obtains the sameN message
descriptors in the same order, including a message descriptor for each honest member. By (i),
the descriptor shuffle is successful for every honest member, and thus they all obtain these same
descriptors. Similarly, every honest member for whom the blame shuffle is successful obtains the
same N accusations in the same order, including each accusation from an honest member. By (ii),
the blame shuffle is successful for every honest member for whom the bulk protocol is successful,
and thus they all obtain these same accusations.
Therefore, if honest members receive different ciphertexts in Phase 4, at least one of the ci-
phertexts must not match the corresponding hash. The recipient of that ciphertext would report the
corruption in Phase 5, and the equivocation would prevent the accusation shuffle from succeeding
for any honest member, contradicting (ii).
Thus all honest members that successfully terminate must have the same sequence of N de-
scriptors and the same ciphertexts. This implies that these members obtain the same N messages in
the same order from the bulk protocol.
In addition, as shown, the descriptors obtained by every honest member include the descriptors
of all of the honest members in the same slots. Because each honest member receives the same
ciphertexts, any corruption of an honest member’s slot would be seen by that member. That member
would then produce an accusation which, as we have described, would be obtained from the blame
shuffle by all honest members who terminate successfully. This would contradict condition (iii)
of successful termination. Therefore, no slot containing an honest member’s descriptor can be
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corrupted at an honest user. This implies that the messages obtained by an honest member from
successful termination of the bulk protocol must contain the messages of all honest members.
Therefore C cannot output 1 in the modified game, and the probability that C outputs 1 in the
original game is negligible.
8.3 Accountability
We use the following sequence of games to prove that the GMP-SHUFFLE and GMP-BULK protocols
offer accountability:
Game 0: Adversary A and challenger C0 play the accountability game.
Game 1: A interacts with a challenger C1 that is the same as C0 except that it outputs 0 when
a signature forgery or hash collision is observed.
Game 2: A interacts with a challenger C2 that is the same as C1 except that it outputs 0 when,
at the end of the challenge run, an honest member i produces an output of (FAILURE, BLAMEi, `i)
with empty BLAMEi or containing pj ∈ BLAMEi such that VERIFY-PROOF(pj , `i) 6= TRUE.
Game 3: A interacts with a challenger C3 that always outputs 0.
It will be shown for both protocols that the output distribution of challenger C changes neg-
ligibly between each sequential pair of games. This holds for Game 0 and Game 1 quite directly
from the security properties of the signature scheme and hash function. The main argument that
it holds for Game 1 and Game 2 is that the protocol fails when one of the checks fails, each such
failure for i results in an addition to BLAMEi, and because VERIFY-PROOF uses the same checks
each such addition produces a verifiable proof. The argument for Game 2 and Game 3 relies on the
fact that the round nonces, phase numbers, and member identities included in each signed message
prevent an adversary from creating a log that contains anything but the actual messages sent by an
honest member in a given round and phase. The protocols ensure that these sent messages include
the messages received by the honest member where necessary. Thus an honest member is always
seen in the log as behaving correctly and cannot be exposed.
8.3.1 The GMP-Shuffle Protocol
Here we denote by Ci the output of the challenger in Game i when running GMP-SHUFFLE.
Lemma 1.
∣∣Pr[C2 = 1]− Pr[C0 = 1]∣∣ is negligible.
Proof. Any forged signature observed by C0 could be used to win the signature game that defines
the EUF-CMA property. Therefore, by the assumption that the signature scheme is EUF-CMA
secure, forged signatures must occur with negligible probability. Similarly, any observed hash col-
lision could be used to win the game that defines the collision resistance of the hash function, and
so one must occur with negligible probability. Thus the output distributions of C0 and C1 are
negligibly close.
Challengers C1 and C2 differ only when an honest member fails but produces either no proof
of misbehavior or a proof that doesn’t verify. We will show that this never happens, that is, that
whenever SUCCESSi = FALSE for honest member i, i adds a proof pj to BLAMEi, and every proof it
adds is verifiable. In fact, it suffices to show that, whenever SUCCESSi = FALSE, i adds a proof pj
to BLAMEi, because it is straightforward to see that any such pj is verifiable. In VERIFY-PROOF-S,
proof verification of pj (Step 1) always succeeds, because pj always includes valid check number
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and member identifier; log verification of `i (Step 2) always succeeds because the protocol com-
pletes by assumption, and i adds all her messages to log `i; and the proof verification decision (Step
3) always succeeds because it outputs TRUE given pj for logs of exactly those executions in which
i adds pj to BLAMEi.
Therefore, we can simply show that, whenever the protocol fails for i, a proof is added to
BLAMEi. In ANONYMIZE-S, SUCCESSi = FALSE upon protocol completion only in the following
three cases: (1) in Phase 4, GOi = FALSE or a non-matching broadcast hash is received, (2) in
Phase 4, GOk = FALSE for some k 6= i, (3) in Phase 5, an empty, invalid, or non-matching inner
private key is received. In any of these cases, if an inconsistent or incomplete ~T log is received in
some µj6, then (j, c1) is added to BLAMEi. Therefore we assume from this point on that all ~T logs
are complete and consistent and proceed to examine these cases separately.
Suppose case (1) occurs. We consider the conditions in each of the phases up to Phase 4 that
can cause GOi = FALSE, and we identify in each case a proof pj that must be added to BLAMEi. In
Phase 1, an invalid public key must be received from some j. Then pj = (j, c5). In Phase 2a, an
invalid commitment must be received from some j. Then pj = (j, c6). In Phase 2b, a commitment
opening must fail or result in an invalid ciphertext or identity. Then pj = (j, c7). In Phase 3, ~Ci
must have an invalid or duplicate ciphertext. If some member j releases an empty, invalid, or non-
matching outer private key in Phase 6, then pj = (j, c4). Otherwise, i replays the permutations and
decryptions of Phase 3. During the replay, if some member j did not correctly permute and decrypt
her inputs, then pj = (j, c8). Otherwise, i must observe a member j whose commitment value
decrypted either to an invalid ciphertext, in which case pj = (j, c9), or to a duplicate ciphertext, in
which case pj = (j, c10). In Phase 4, it could be that the inner ciphertext C ′j is not in ~CN . In this
case, as in the previous one, if some member j releases an empty, invalid, or non-matching outer
private key in Phase 6, then pj = (j, c4). Otherwise, i replays Phase 3 and during the replay must
observe some member j who did not correctly permute and decrypt her inputs. Then pj = (j, c8).
It could also be that a non-matching broadcast hash is received from j, in which case j must have
sent an incorrect hash, and pj = (j, c12).
Next suppose case (2) occurs. If some member j releases an empty, invalid, or non-matching
outer private key in Phase 6, then pj = (j, c4). Otherwise, i replays the protocol. If any member j
sent an invalid public key or an invalid commitment, then pj = (j, c5) or pj = (j, c6), respectively.
If k = 1 and commitment opening failed or resulted in an invalid ciphertext for some j, then
pj = (j, c7). If there were invalid or duplicate ciphertexts in ~Ck, then i must observe a member
j who either did not correctly permute and decrypt her inputs, in which case pj = (j, c8), or
committed to a value that decrypted to an invalid or duplicate ciphertext, in which case pj = (j, c9)
or pj = (j, c10), respectively. If the inner ciphertext of member k is not included in ~CN , then there
must be some member j who did not correctly permute and decrypt her inputs, and pj = (j, c8).
Otherwise, k incorrectly set GOk, and pj = (j, c11) with j = k.
Finally, suppose case (3) occurs. An empty inner private key can only be justified by a GOk =
FALSE for some k or a non-matching broadcast hash from some j. In either case we have already
identified the pj added by i. If an empty key from some j is not justified, then pj = (j, c3). If an
invalid or non-matching inner private key is received from some j, then pj = (j, c2).
Thus we have shown that honest member i adds some proof pj to BLAMEi whenever SUCCESSi =
FALSE, and furthermore that any such pj is a verifiable proof given log `i. Therefore the output dis-
tributions of C1 and C2 are identical.
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Lemma 2.
∣∣Pr[C3 = 1]− Pr[C2 = 1]∣∣ is negligible.
Proof. Suppose that the adversary exposes an honest member j. That is, suppose that he produces a
proof pj and log `i such that VERIFY-PROOF-S(pj , `i) = TRUE. To pass the initial proof verification,
it must be the case that pj = (c, j). To pass the log verification, it must be the case either that c = c1
or that all the ~T logs in the µj6 of `i are complete and consistent.
Each message in ANONYMIZE-S identifies the sender and is signed by that sender. By the EUF-
CMA property of the signature scheme, the adversary is not able to forge a signature under any
honest member’s key, except with negligible probability, and therefore any message signed by j in
`i must have been sent by j. Furthermore, each message identifies the round and phase for which
that message was sent. An honest member sends exactly one message during each phase of a given
round. Therefore, every message in `i from j must have actually been sent during that round and
phase by j.
Given these facts, we can go through each possible check and show that for each one the needed
log evidence cannot exist. Whenever we refer to message µkφ, we are referring to the message that
`i indicates was sent by member k in phase φ.
Suppose that c = c1. Then for the proof to verify, `i must contain either different copies of the
same message for a given phase or an incomplete log ~T in a µj6. An honest j would never send
such messages. Thus c 6= c1.
In each of the remaining cases, the log vectors ~T in the µk6 were verified during log verification
to be complete and consistent, and `i is augmented with all messages from all members during
Phases 1–5. Thus we can assume that each message µkφ sent or received by j during these phases
appears with the same contents in `i.
Suppose that c = c2. Then it must be the case that µj1 and µj5 have non-matching I
pub
j and
Isecj . j would never send such a pair, however. Thus c 6= c2.
Suppose that c = c3. Then j must have sent an empty inner key, which implies that j observed
either a GOk = FALSE or a non-matching broadcast hash HASHkh{ ~Bk}. Therefore the µk4 do not
contain the evidence needed for VERIFY-PROOF-S to validate this check. Thus c 6= c3.




j that do not match, or j
incorrectly sent an empty outer private key. j only ever sends matching outer keys, and so the
former case cannot apply. If j sent an empty outer private key, it must have been the case that, for
all µk4, the contained GOk = TRUE and HASHkh{ ~Bk} = HASHkh{ ~Bj}. Therefore the µk4 do not
contain the evidence needed for VERIFY-PROOF-S to validate this check. Thus c 6= c4.
Suppose that c = c5. Then j must have sent an invalid key in µj1. An honest j would never
send an invalid key, though, and thus c 6= c5.
Suppose that c = c6. The j must have sent an invalid commitment in µj2a. An honest j would
never send an invalid commitment, though, and thus c 6= c6.
Suppose that c = c7. Then either j’s commitment opening in µj2b does not match the commit-
ment in µj2a, or the value from the opening is not a valid ciphertext or identity. j always sends a
matching commitment and opening, though, and j’s committed value is always a valid ciphertext
and her identity. Thus c 6= c7.
Suppose that c = c8. Then the messages in µj3 must not be a permutation and decryption of
the messages in µ(j−1)3 using the key Osecj released by j. However, j does correctly permute and
decrypt during Phase 3 and only ever releases the correct key used in that decryption. Thus c 6= c8.
Suppose that c = c9. Then j must send a value Cj into the Phase 3 shuffle that results in
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an invalid ciphertext after some sequence of decryptions by the outer private keys released by all
members. Those private keys are checked to match the outer public keys received by j, however, and
j correctly forms Cj by encrypting mj with the inner and outer public keys in sequence. Therefore
it can never be that Cj results in an invalid ciphertext after decryption by some of the outer private
keys, and c 6= c9.
Suppose that c = c10. Then it must be that for some ciphertext Ck, k 6= j, both Ck and Cj yield
the same result after some number of sequential decryptions by the outer private keys. As we es-
tablished above, the messages in Phases 1–5 of `i sent and received by j and other honest members
are those actually they sent and received during the protocol run. Thus, the honest commitments
must be created according to the commitment protocol. If k is honest, then it must be the case the
same ciphertext was produced twice, which cannot happen with more than negligible probability
or it could be used to break the IND-CCA2 security of the encryption scheme. Suppose k is not
honest. Then, by the simulation definition of non-malleable commitment (Lin, Pass, and Venkita-
subramaniam 2008), it must be possible for a simulator to commit to a set of values that, along with
the rest of the simulator’s view, are indistinguishable from member k’s committed values and view.
These must remain indistinguishable even given any auxiliary input. Consider as auxiliary input the
private outer keys of all members. Then it is observable via simple decryption when a ciphertext
Ck would “collide” with Cj after some number of decryptions during the shuffle anonymization.
Thus the simulator must commit to such a ciphertext with probability negligibly close to that of
the adversary. However, a simulator producing such a collision is effectively predicting the result
of the inner encryptions by honest members, any one of which could be used in a reduction to the
distinguishing game. Thus, by the IND-CCA2 security of the encryption scheme, the ciphertext
collision can occur with at most negligible probability. Thus c 6= c10.
Suppose that c = c11. Then it must be that j sent GOj = FALSE without justification. The
justification needed would be receiving an invalid public key in Phase 1, receiving an invalid com-
mitment in Phase 2a, receiving an invalid commitment opening or opening an invalid ciphertext or
identity in Phase 2b, producing invalid or duplicate ciphertexts during Phase 3, or not receiving her
own inner ciphertext C ′j at the end of Phase 3. However, each of these conditions is true in `i if
it was true during the run from j’s perspective. In particular, the inner ciphertext as determined
by VERIFY-PROOF-S must be the inner ciphertext of j because the decryption keys are verified to
match the public keys seen by j. j would only send GOj = FALSE if one of these conditions held,
and thus c 6= c11.
Suppose that c = c12. Then it must be that the broadcast hash that j sent in Phase 4 does not
match the hash of all broadcast messages up to that point. j sends the correct hash, however, and
thus c 6= c12.
Therefore, there is no value of c for which VERIFY-PROOF-S could output TRUE given `i, except
with negligible probability, and the adversary cannot expose an honest member.
Theorem 3. The GMP-SHUFFLE protocol offers accountability.
Proof. Lemmas 1 and 2 show that the challenger output distribution in the accountability game is
negligibly close to the challenger output in Game 3. C3 always outputs 0, and thus the probability
that C outputs 1 in the accountability game is negligible.
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8.3.2 The GMP-Bulk Protocol
Here we denote by Ci the output of the challenger in Game i when running GMP-BULK.
Lemma 3.
∣∣Pr[C2 = 1]− Pr[C0 = 1]∣∣ is negligible.
Proof. Any forged signature or hash collision observed by C0 could be used to win the security
game that defines EUF-CMA or collision resistance, respectively. Thus, those security assumptions
imply that such events must occur with negligible probability, and so the output distributions of C0
and C1 are negligibly close.
We will show that, whenever SUCCESSi = FALSE, i adds a proof pj to BLAMEi, and every
proof it adds is verifiable. In fact, it will suffice to show that, whenever SUCCESSi = FALSE, i adds
a proof pj to BLAMEi, because we first prove that any such pj is verifiable.
In VERIFY-PROOF-B, proof verification of pj (Step 1) always succeeds, because honest i always
includes a valid check number and member identifier in pj . Log verification of `i (Step 2) always
succeeds because the protocol completes by assumption, and i adds all her messages to log `i.
Finally, given complete log `i, the properties of that log that must hold for the proof verification
decision (Step 3) to output TRUE on proof pj are almost exactly the same properties that must hold
for honest i to add pj to BLAMEi. In fact, VERIFY-PROOF-B only verifies as true more proofs for a
given log than would be created by i, as we show by considering each check separately:
• pj = (j, c1): VERIFY-PROOF-B omits checking for (j, c11) ∈ BLAMEs2i and otherwise makes
the same log checks to verify pj as ANONYMIZE-B does during blame to produce pj .
• pj = (j, c2): VERIFY-PROOF-B and ANONYMIZE-B use the same log checks for this pj .
• pj = (j, c3): VERIFY-PROOF-B adds a check to make sure that the descriptors claimed by i
are those received by j, but this check is always satisfied by the log of an honest i. All other
checks are the same for this pj .
• pj = (j, c4): VERIFY-PROOF-B omits checking that the blame shuffle succeeds and that ~Vi
contains some GOk = FALSE. Otherwise, it is the same as ANONYMIZE-B for this pj .
• pj = (j, c5): VERIFY-PROOF-B omits checking that the blame shuffle succeeds, that ~Vi con-
tains some GOk = FALSE, and that the member with evidence of a bad key gets blamed first.
Otherwise, it the same as ANONYMIZE-B for this pj .
• pj = (j, c6): VERIFY-PROOF-B omits checking that the blame shuffle succeeds, that ~Vi con-
tains some GOk = FALSE, and that the member with equivocation evidence gets blamed first.
Otherwise, it the same as ANONYMIZE-B for this pj .
Thus, VERIFY-PROOF-B(pj , `i) = TRUE for every pj ∈ BLAMEi.
Therefore, we can simply show that, whenever the protocol fails for i, a proof is added to
BLAMEi. In ANONYMIZE-B, SUCCESSi = FALSE upon protocol completion only in the following
cases:
1. The blame shuffle fails.
2. The blame shuffle succeeds and outputs a valid accusation.
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3. Some µj4 contains GOj = FALSE.
We consider each case and identify a proof p that is added to BLAMEi in each one.
In case (1), by Theorem 3, there exists a verifiable proof (j, c) ∈ BLAMEs2i given `s2i . If c = c11
and evidence of ciphertext equivocation by k exists in µj7, then p = (k, c1). Otherwise, p = (j, c2).
In case (2), p = (j, c3). In case (3), p = (j, c4) if µj4 contains no verifiable proofs, p = (k, c2) if
µj4 has a verifiable proof of k’s misbehavior and k provides no justification in µk3, and p = (`, c5)
or p = (`, c6) if µj4 has a verifiable proof of k’s misbehavior but k provide evidence against ` in
µk3.
Thus, if GMP-BULK fails for i, BLAMEi contains a verifiable proof given `i and only contains
such proofs.
Lemma 4.
∣∣Pr[C3 = 1]− Pr[C2 = 1]∣∣ is negligible.
Proof. Suppose that the adversary exposes an honest member j. To pass the proof verification
of VERIFY-PROOF-B, it must be the case that he produces a proof pj = (c, j). To pass the log
verification, it must be the case the log `i is complete.
Each message in ANONYMIZE-B identifies the sender and is signed by that sender. By the
assumption the signature scheme is EUF-CMA, the adversary is not able to forge a signature under
any honest member’s key, except with negligible probability, and therefore any message signed by j
in `i must have been sent by j. Furthermore, each message identifies the round and phase for which
that message was sent. An honest member sends at most one message during each phase of a given
round. Therefore, every message in `i from j must have actually been sent during that round and
phase by j.
Given these facts, we can go through each possible check and show that for each one the needed
log evidence cannot exist. Whenever we refer to message µkφ, we are referring to the message that
`i indicates was sent by member k in phase φ.
Suppose that c = c1. Then for the proof to verify, `i must contain different copies of the same
message for Phase 4. An honest j always sends the same message to every member in any given
phase and therefore such messages do not exist. Thus c 6= c1.
Suppose that c = c2. Then ANONYMIZE-S must have failed in Phase 3 or Phase 7.
If ANONYMIZE-S failed in Phase 3, then for the proof to verify member j must have not dis-
tributed a proof of another member’s bad key or key equivocation, and there must be a verifiable
pj ∈ BLAMEs1k for some member k. However, if j intentionally causes a failure, then she always
distributes an appropriate proof in µj3, and if she does not, then by Theorem 3 a verifiable proof
blaming j cannot be produced, except with negligible probability.
If ANONYMIZE-S failed for i in Phase 7, then for the proof to verify member j must have
not distributed a proof another’s member equivocation in Phase 4, and pj ∈ BLAMEs2i must be
verifiable. However, if j causes a failure of the blame shuffle, then she always distributes a proof of
equivocation in µj7, and if she does not, then by Theorem 3 a verifiable proof blaming j cannot be
produced, except with negligible probability. Thus c 6= c2.
Suppose that c = c3. Then j must have sent an incorrect or empty ciphertext in Phase 4.
Observe that the hash of broadcast messages in `i is verified to be equal to the broadcast hash
sent by j, and thus, by the second-preimage resistance property, it must be that the inner public
keys and inner ciphertexts in `i are the same as those seen by j, except with negligible probability.
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The inner private keys are verified to match their public keys, and thus the descriptors computed by
VERIFY-PROOF-B must match those seen by j.
An honest j would only send a non-empty ciphertext C ′kj if the pseudorandom bits from its
decrypted seed yield the correct hash value. Given that the computed descriptors match those seen
by j and that only one seed can encrypt to a given ciphertext, the accusation must not satisfy the
validity checks in VERIFY-PROOF-B.
If j sends an empty ciphertext C ′kj , then it must be that due to a problem with descriptor dk
that she observed. That is, it must be that Skj is not a valid ciphertext, skj is not a valid seed, or
HASHkh{Ckj} 6= Hkj . If any of the above descriptor problems exist, then because the descriptors
used in VERIFY-PROOF-B must match the ones seen by j, the accusation must not satisfy the validity
checks in VERIFY-PROOF-B. Thus c 6= c3.
Suppose that c = c4. Then it must be that j sent GOj = FALSE in µj4 without justification. The
justification needed either would be evidence in µj3 of a bad key or key equivocation in Phase 1a or
would be a verifiable proof in µj4 of misbehavior during ANONYMIZE-S in Phase 3.
If j sent GOj = FALSE in µj4, it must have been that the descriptor shuffle failed for j. If j
intentionally caused this shuffle to fail, then j observed bad or non-matching keys and distributed
the evidence in µj3. If j did not intentionally cause shuffle failure, then by Theorem 3, BLAMEs1j
contains a verifiable proof given `s1j . Thus c 6= c4.
Suppose that c = c5. Then j must have sent an invalid key in µj1a. An honest j would never
send an invalid key, though, and thus c 6= c5.
Suppose that c = c6. Then for the proof to verify, `i must contain different copies of the same
message for Phase 1a. However, an honest j always sends the same message to every member in
any given phase. Thus c 6= c6.
Therefore, there is no value of c for which VERIFY-PROOF-B could output TRUE given `i, except
with negligible probability, and the adversary cannot expose an honest member.
Theorem 4. The GMP-BULK protocol offers accountability.
Proof. Lemmas 3 and 4 show that the challenger output distribution in the accountability game is
negligibly close to the challenger output in Game 3. C3 always outputs 0, and thus the probability
that C outputs 1 in the accountability game is negligible.
8.4 Anonymity
We prove that GMP-SHUFFLE and GMP-BULK maintain anonymity by sequentially modifying the
original anonymity-game challenger C so that in Game i adversary A plays the anonymity game
with challenger Ci. For Game i we define a “game output” Gi that is closely related to the adver-
sary’s output. Let ∆(Gi) denote
∣∣Pr [Gi(0) = 1]− Pr [Gi(1) = 1]∣∣, which is the advantage of
game Gi. We generally omit the challenge bit b that is technically an input to the game outputs,
the challengers, and random variables that we define as a function of the challengers. Let b be the
complement of bit b: b = 1− b. Let h1, h2, . . . , hN−k be the honest users in the order they appear
in the member permutation τ produced by SETUP.
8.4.1 The GMP-Shuffle Protocol
We show that the adversary’s advantage in winning the anonymity game with GMP-SHUFFLE is
negligible by proving that the game’s advantage changes negligibly between neighboring games
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and is zero in the final game.
We begin by using any adversary A to construct Game 0, in which a new challenger C0 ran-
domly guesses whether a given honest user will release her outer private key during the final phases
of the protocol. When C0 guesses correctly, he behaves exactly as C would in the anonymity game
and the game ends with the output of A. When C0 guesses incorrectly, the game output is a random
bit. C0 guesses independently ofA, and so we will be able to show that the game output’s advantage
in Game 0 is 1/2 the advantage of A in the anonymity game.
Then we define Game 1, in which a further modified challenger C1 creates the inner or outer
ciphertexts of α by starting with a plaintext unrelated to the challenge message mb. We will be
able to show that advantage in Game 1 is negligibly close to the advantage in Game 0 by showing
how a non-negligible change in advantage would allow us to distinguish encrypted messages with
non-negligible probability.
Finally, we define Game 2 by creating a challenger C2 from C1 in the same way that C1 was
created from C0, except replacing α by β and mb with mb¯ in the changes. We can show that the
advantage changes negligibly from Game 1 to Game 2 using a similar argument as used from Game
0 to Game 1. It will be the case that the advantage in Game 2 must be 0 because the adversary sees
the same distribution of messages from the challenger regardless of the challenge bit.
Let Zi indicate that the challenger Ci guesses that h1 should release her outer private key at
some point as part of ANONYMIZE-S, and let F i indicate whether or not the challenger failed in
Game i.
Game 0: In this game, A interacts with a challenger C0 that sometimes fails. C0 sets Z0 ∈
{0, 1} uniformly at random. C0 differs from C in the following cases of the challenge shuffle, when
his guess about which keys will be released proves to be incorrect:
1. In Phase 3 (Anonymization), Z0 = 0 and the partial decryptions of the outer ciphertexts Cα
and Cβ with keys Isec1 . . . , I
sec
h1−1 do not appear exactly once each in the ciphertext vector
~Ch1−1 sent to h1. C0 can check this by comparing to the partial ciphertexts created during
Phase 2a.
2. In Phase 4 (Verification), Z0 = 0 and either of the inner ciphertexts C ′α and C ′β is missing
either from the copy of vector ~CN sent to α or from the copy sent to β. Again, C0 can notice
this by comparing to inner ciphertexts created during Phase 2a.
3. In Phase 5 (Key Release and Decryption), Z0 = 1 and member h1 receives GOj = TRUE and
HASHkh{ ~Bj} = HASHkh{ ~Bh1} for every member j 6= h1, and GOh1 = TRUE.
4. In Phase 6 (Blame), Z0 = 0 and i) GOh1 = FALSE, ii) h1 received GOj = FALSE from any
member j, or iii) h1 received HASHkh{ ~Bj} 6= HASHkh{ ~Bh1} from any member j.
In each of these cases, F 0 = 1, C0 terminates, and the game output G0 is set to a uniformly random
bit. This is also the result if C0 observes a hash collision. In every other case, F 0 = 0, C0 correctly
executes ANONYMIZE-S on behalf of the honest users, and G0 is set to the output bit of A.
Game 1: In this game, we further modify the challenger to define C1, which replaces with
unrelated ciphertexts the intermediate stages of the construction of the inner or outer ciphertext of
α, depending on Z1. That is, C1 behaves the same as C0, except
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1. In Phase 2a,









, and the outer ciphertext is then created as Cα = {C ′′α}Opubh1−1:Opub1 .
Also create C ′α = {mb}IpubN :Ipub1 for later use. The public keys used for each ciphertext of α
are those received by α in Phase 1.
Case 2: Z1 = 1. The inner ciphertext for α is created and stored as C ′α = {α}IpubN :Ipub1 , and
the outer ciphertext Cα is created from C ′α in the same way as C0. Again, the public keys
used for each ciphertext of α are those received by α in Phase 1.
The rest of the phase is executed in the same way as C0.
2. In Phase 3, if Z1 = 0 and both the stored ciphertext C ′′α and the partial decryption of Cβ
by IsecN . . . , I
sec
h1−1 (which C
1 knows because it created Cβ) appear exactly once each in the
vector of ciphertexts ~Ch1−1 sent to h1, then replace C ′′α with {C ′α}OpubN :Opubh1+1 for inclusion in
the vector ~Ch1 sent to h1 + 1, where the encryption uses the outer keys sent to α.
In every other way, C1 executes in the same way as C0.
Game 2: This game is created from Game 1 using the same changes given in its definition,
except replacing α with β and mb with mb¯ everywhere.
The following lemma shows that Game 0 is a relevant starting point because its output’s advan-





∣∣∣Pr [AC(0) = 1]− Pr [AC(1) = 1]∣∣∣ ,
where the probability is taken over the randomness of both the adversary and the challenger.
Proof. Let TA,C be the set of all possible game transcripts, that is, sequences of messages, between
A and C. Let TA,C0 be the set of transcripts between A and C0. We claim that each member of
TA,C and TA,C0 falls into exactly one of following cases, which are nearly the same as the failure
cases defining Game 0:
1. In Phase 3, the expected ciphertexts of α and β are not sent to h1 exactly once each.
2. Case 1 does not occur, and in Phase 4, either of the inner ciphertexts C ′α and C ′β is missing
from either the copy of vector ~CN sent to α or the copy sent to β.
3. At the start of Phase 5, GOh1 = TRUE, and h1 receives from every member j GOj = TRUE
and HASHkh{ ~Bj} = HASHkh{ ~Bh1}.
4. Case 1 does not occur, Case 2 does not occur, and at the start of Phase 6 i) GOh1 = FALSE, ii)
h1 received GOj = FALSE from some member j, or iii) HASHkh{ ~Bj} 6= HASHkh{ ~Bh1} from
some member j.
Cases 1, 2, and 4 are mutually exclusive events because the latter of these cases are explicitly defined
to occur only when the previous do not. Case 3 is disjoint from the other three cases because each
of them either results in termination before Phase 5 or results in GOh = FALSE sent in Phase 5 from
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an honest node h. One of these cases always occurs because one of the following is true of the
execution:
1. The challenger fails, which as mentioned above only happens in one of these cases.
2. After Phase 4, GOh1 = FALSE or h1 received from some member j GOj = FALSE or
HASHkh{ ~Bj} 6= HASHkh{ ~Bh1}, which implies that one of Cases 1, 2, or 4 above occurred.
3. After Phase 4, GOh1 = TRUE and h1 received from every member j GOj = TRUE and
HASHkh{ ~Bj} = HASHkh{ ~Bh1}, which implies that Case 3 above occurred.
Now consider members of TA,C that fall in Case 1 above. C0 sends messages according to the
same distribution as C up to the Phase 3 message to h1. Whether or not Case 1 also applies to
a transcript in TA,C0 is determined by the messages up to this point. Thus the probability that
Case 1 applies to a transcript in TA,C0 is the same as for a transcript in TA,C . Moreover, Z0
is independent of these messages, and thus C0 fails under the first failure case of Game 0 with
probability 1/2 among those TA,C0 transcripts in Case 1. Among those same transcripts where C0
does not fail under the first failure case, Z0 must be 1 and GOh1 = FALSE if Phase 4 is reached,
so the other failure cases of Game 0 don’t apply and C0 behaves the same as C throughout the
transcript. Therefore, the distribution of TA,C0 transcripts in Case 1 given that F 0 = 0 is the same
as the distribution of TA,C transcripts in Case 1.
Next consider those TA,C transcripts not in Case 1. Because Case 1 does not apply, C and C0
behave the same up through Phase 3. Whether or not Case 2 applies is determined by the end of
Phase 3. Thus the probability that Case 2 applies to a TA,C0 transcript is the same as for a TA,C
transcript. Z0 is again independent of all partial TA,C0 transcripts in Case 2 up through Phase 3.
Thus, C0 fails under the second Game 0 failure case in transcripts in this case with probability
1/2. Moreover, when C0 does not fail under the second failure case but the transcript is in Case 2,
Z0 = 1 and either GOh = FALSE for one of h ∈ {α, β} or the hashes of the broadcast vectors of
α and β don’t match. Thus, the other failure cases of Game 0 don’t apply, and so C0 behaves the
same as C throughout the transcript. Therefore, the distribution of TA,C0 transcripts in Case 2 given
that F = 0 is the same as the distribution of TA,C transcripts in Case 2.
Next consider those TA,C transcripts not in either Case 1 or Case 2. Because Case 1 and Case
2 don’t apply, C and C0 behave the same up through Phase 4. Whether or not Case 3 applies is
determined by the end of Phase 4. Thus the probability that Case 3 applies to a TA,C0 transcript is the
same as for a TA,C transcript. Z0 is again independent of all partial TA,C0 transcripts in Case 3 up
through Phase 4. Thus,C0 fails under the third failure case in transcripts in this case with probability
1/2. Moreover, when C0 does not fail under the third failure case but the transcript is in Case 3,
Z0 = 0, GOh1 = TRUE, h1 receives GOj = TRUE from all j, and HASHkh{ ~Bj} = HASHkh{ ~Bh1}
for all j. Thus, the fourth failure case of Game 0 does not apply. The first two failure cases can’t
apply to any transcript in Case 3, and so C0 behaves the same as C throughout the transcript.
Therefore, the distribution of TA,C0 transcripts in Case 3 given that F 0 = 0 is the same as the
distribution of TA,C transcripts in Case 3.
Finally, consider those TA,C transcripts not in Case 1, Case 2, or Case 3. Because Cases 1–3
don’t apply, C and C0 behave the same up through Phase 5. Whether or not Case 4 applies is
determined by the end of Phase 5. Thus the probability that Case 4 applies to a TA,C0 transcript is
the same as for a TA,C transcript. Z0 is again independent of all partial TA,C0 transcripts in Case
42
4 up through Phase 5. Thus, C0 fails under the fourth failure case in transcripts in this case with
probability 1/2. Moreover, the other failure cases don’t apply to transcripts in Case 4, and so, when
Case 4 applies but C0 does not fail, C0 behaves the same as C throughout the transcript. Therefore,
the distribution of TA,C0 transcripts in Case 4 given that F 0 = 0 is the same as the distribution of
TA,C transcripts in Case 4.
Thus, because F 0 = 0 with probability 1/2 for each of the above cases, F 0 = 0 with probability
1/2 overall. In addition, because the distribution of TA,C0 transcripts in each of the above cases
conditional on F 0 = 0 is the same as the distribution of TA,C transcripts in the same cases, and the
probability of each case is the same between TA,C and CA,C0 , the conditional distribution of TA,C0
given F 0 = 0 is the same as the distribution of TA,C . The game output G0(b) is AC
0(b) if F 0 = 0
and is a uniformly random bit if F 0 = 1. Therefore,










which proves the lemma.
The next lemma shows that changing the ciphertexts between Game 0 and Game 1 can only
change the advantage of the game output by a negligible amount.
Lemma 6.
∣∣∆(G1)−∆(G0)∣∣ is negligible.
Proof. We prove the lemma by constructing a distinguisher D(b) that has a non-negligible advan-
tage in the distinguishing game if |Pr[G1(b) = 1] − Pr[G0(b) = 1]| is non-negligible. Let bD be
the challenge bit in the distinguishing game. D interacts with the distinguishing-game challenger
CD(bD) and A to execute either Game 0 or Game 1, depending on bD, as follows:
1. D simulates the challenger of the anonymity gameC(b) exactly up to Phase 1 of the challenge
shuffle. Let Z denote the random guess about later key releases that D makes as part of the
simulation.
2. For Phase 1, D generates encryption key pairs (Isechi , I
pub
hi
) and (Osechi , O
pub
hi
), 1 < i ≤ N − k.











) = (Ksec2 ,K
pub
2 ).







) = (Ksec2 ,K
pub
2 ).
Then D broadcasts these public keys from the honest members as described in the protocol.
43
3. For Phase 2a,
Case 1: Z = 0. D sets C ′α = {mb}IpubN :Ipub1 , m
′
0 = {C ′α}OpubN :Opubh1+1 and





and receives cbD as a response. D sets C
′′
α = cbD . D then finishes the phase as C
1 would
starting after it creates C ′′α in Case 1.
Case 2: Z = 1. D sets m′0 = {mb}IpubN :Ipubh1+1 and m
′





to CD and receives cbD as a response. D sets C
′
α = {cbD}Ipubh1−1:Ipub1 . All encryption is done
using the keys received by α. D then finishes the phase as C1 would starting after it creates
C ′α in Case 2.
4. Phase 2b is executed as described in the protocol.
5. For Phase 3, D first receives a ciphertext vector of ~Ch1−1 intended for h1. Then
Case 1: Z = 0, and both C ′′α and the partial decryption of Cβ by IsecN , . . . , I
sec
h1−1 (which
D can check because that ciphertext was constructed by D alone) appear in ~Ch1−1 exactly
once. Then D replaces C ′′α with m′0, decrypts the remaining ciphertexts using CD, shuffles
the vector, and sets ~Ch1 to the result. D then finishes the phase as described in the protocol
starting with sending ~Ch1 to member h1 + 1.
Case 2: Z = 0, and C ′′α or the partial decryption of Cβ does not appear in ~Ch1−1 exactly
once. In this case, D terminates the simulation and sets G ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random.
Case 3: Z = 1. D has the private outer keys for all honest members, and therefore can
execute this phase just as C1 would.
D executes this phase for other honest members hi, i > 1, as described in the protocol.
6. D executes Phase 4 as C1 would, which is possible because this phase uses no private keys.
If C1 terminates, D terminates the simulation and sets G ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random.
7. D executes Phase 5 as C1 would. This is possible because if Z = 0 D has the inner private
keys and if Z = 1 C1 fails if inner private keys are required. If C1 fails, D terminates the
simulation and sets G ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random.
8. D executes Phase 6 as C1 would. This is possible because if Z = 0 C1 fails if outer keys are
required and if Z = 1 D has the outer private keys. If C1 fails, D terminates the simulation
and sets G ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random.
9. As many times as requested, D takes messages for the honest members and executes the
shuffle protocol with A.
10. If the simulation did not terminate prematurely, let bˆA be the guess output by A and set
G = bˆA. D outputs its guess in the distinguishing game as bˆD = G.
We claim that D simulates CbD with A, that is, that D effectively executes Game 0 or Game 1,
depending on bD. That D correctly simulates all steps of the anonymity game except the challenge
shuffle (i.e. Steps 1–4, 6, and 7) follows because it is defined as doing so, and these steps are the
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same for C0 and C1. To show that the challenge shuffle (Step 5) is simulated correctly, we show
that for each phase, D simulates CbD :
• Phase 1: Although one public key is determined by the challenger CD, the end result is that
D broadcasts inner and outer public keys for honest members that are generated using the
cryptosystem’s key generation algorithm, just as both C0 and C1 do.
• Phase 2a:
Case 1: bD = 0. The result of using the response from CD to construct Cα is that α commits
to {{mb}IpubN :Ipub1 }OpubN :Opub1 , where the keys used are those received by α, just as in C
0. The
other honest members behave as they do in C1 by definition, which is the same as in C0.









, where the keys used are those received by α, just as inC1. The other
honest members behave as they do in C1 by definition.
• Phase 2b: D, C0, and C1 all execute this phase as described in the protocol.
• Phase 3:
Case 1: Z = 0 and both C ′′α and the partial decryption of Cβ by IsecN , . . . , I
sec
h1−1 appear in
~Ch1−1 exactly once. For h1, D replaces C ′′α with m′0 = {{mb}IpubN :Ipub1 }OpubN :Opubh1+1 when
constructing ~Ch1 , and the other ciphertexts are simply decrypted . This is just as both C
0 and
C1 would have done. For the other honest members, D executes them as described in the
protocol, just as C0 and C1 would do.
Case 2: Z = 0 and either C ′′α or the partial decryption of Cβ by IsecN , . . . , I
sec
h1−1 does not
appear in ~Ch1−1 exactly once. D terminates the game, just as both C0 and C1 would do.
Case 3: Z = 1. D executes just as C1 would by definition, which is the same as C0.
• Phases 4–6: D executes these phases just as C1 would by definition, which is the same as C0.
Thus D correctly simulates CbD for A. Moreover, observe that when CbD does not prematurely
terminate, then D uses the output bˆA of A for the game output G, and when CbD does terminate,
then D randomly sets G ∈ {0, 1}. This is exactly how GbD is set. Therefore, the advantage of D in
the distinguishing game is∣∣∣Pr [bˆD = 1|bD = 1]− Pr [bˆD = 1|bD = 0]∣∣∣ = |Pr[G = 1|bD = 1]− Pr[G = 1|bD = 0]|
=
∣∣Pr [G1 = 1]− Pr [G0 = 1]∣∣ .
Therefore, because we assume that the cryptosystem is IND-CCA2, Pr[G1 = 1] − Pr[G0 = 1]
must be negligible. This implies the lemma.
Game 1 is modified to create Game 2 by replacing some ciphertexts of β just as Game 0 was
modified to create Game 1 by replacing ciphertexts of α. Thus for similar reasons as before, it holds




Proof. The proof is exactly the same as the proof for Lemma 6 except for the following changes:




2. The simulation claim is that D simulates CbD+1 for A, rather than CbD . Thus the resulting
execution is identical to either Game 2 or Game 1, rather than Game 1 or Game 0, and the
output G is has the same distribution as GbD+1, rather than GbD .
We now show that when Game 2 does not fail, the adversary has the same view whether mc0
belongs to α or β and therefore has no advantage in the output of Game 2. In doing so we view the
challenger C2 as invoking a subroutine C ′2 that just executes the challenge shuffle of the anonymity
game. This view allows our results to be reused when proving the anonymity of the bulk protocol,
which calls the shuffle as a subprotocol.
Specifically, we consider the simulation by C2 of ANONYMIZE-S during the challenge run of
the shuffle protocol as an invocation of C ′2. The inputs from C2 to C ′2 are the challenge bit b,
the challenge members α and β, the challenge messages mc0 and m
c
1, the honest non-challenge
messages {mh}h∈H\{α,β}, the round number nR, the signing keys K, the member ordering τ , and
fail flags {fh = FALSE}h∈H . Let I be a vector all of these inputs except b. Let the output of honest
members from the challenge shuffle be O = (Oh1 , . . . , OhN−k), where Ohi is the output of hi. C
2
fails if and only if C ′2 fails. Let F ′2 indicate that C ′2 fails. Let M be the transcript of messages
between C ′2 and A during the challenge shuffle. When F ′2 = 1, O and M are defined to take a
constant failure value.
The following lemma shows that changing the challenge bit b does not change the joint proba-
bility of challenger failure, shuffle messages, and honest members’ shuffle outputs:
Lemma 8.
Pr[M = m∧O = o∧ F ′2 = f |I = i∧ b = 0] = Pr[M = m∧O = o∧ F ′2 = f |I = i∧ b = 1].
Proof. We consider the messages sent in each phase as well as the final output and show that they
do not depend on b. In order to do this, we also track some of the internal variables and show that
they are updated the same way regardless of b.
• Phase 1:
– C ′2 sets guess Z2 independently of b.
– Each honest member h generates inner and outer keypairs (Isech , I
pub






– The message µh1 = {Ipubh , Opubh , nR,1, h}SIGuh sent by each honest member h ∈ H is
independent of b by the above.
– The messages to h from other honest members are shown above to be independent of b.
– The messages to h from A are independent of b because A uses the outputs of SETUP-S
as well as the messages from honest users to generate its messages, both of which are
shown above to be independent of b.
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– GOh is set to FALSE if h receives invalid public keys. Thus by the above GOh is inde-
pendent of b.
• Phase 2a: This phase depends on Z2, which has been shown to be independent of b.
– Case 1: Z2 = 0.
∗ The partially decrypted outer ciphertextsC ′′h = {{h}IpubN :Ipub1 }OpubN :Opubh1 , h ∈ {α, β}
do not depend on b by the above.
∗ The outer ciphertexts Ch = {C ′′h}Opubh1−1:Opub1 , h ∈ {α, β}, do not depend on b by
the above.
∗ The inner ciphertexts C ′h = {dh}IpubN :Ipub1 , h ∈ H\{α, β}, do not depend on b by
the above.
∗ The outer ciphertexts Ch = {C ′h}OpubN :Opub1 , h ∈ H\{α, β}, do not depend on b by
the above.
∗ Note that the inner ciphertext C ′α = {mb}IpubN :Ipub1 does depend on b (and similarly
for C ′β).
– Case 2: Z2 = 1.
∗ The inner ciphertexts C ′h = {h}IpubN :Ipub1 , h ∈ {α, β}, do not depend on b by the
above.
∗ The inner ciphertexts C ′h = {dh}IpubN :Ipub1 , h ∈ H\{α, β}, do not depend on b by
the above.
∗ The outer ciphertexts Ch = {C ′h}OpubN :Opub1 , h ∈ H , do not depend on b by the
above.
– The commitments Xh = COMMIT{Ch, h}, h ∈ H , do not depend on b because h does
not and Ch does not by the above.
– The message µh2a = {Xh, nR,2a, h}SIGuh sent by each h ∈ H does not depend on b
by the above.
– The additional inputs to A since his last output are messages µh2a, h ∈ H , shown
above to be independent of b. Thus the messages µi2a, i ∈ D, received by h ∈ H are
independent of b.
– The messages µh2a, h ∈ H , received by h′ ∈ H are shown above to be independent of
b.
– GOh is set to FALSE if h receives an invalid commitment, h ∈ H . Thus GOh still does
not depend on b by the above.
• Phase 2b:
– The message µh2b = {OPEN{Xh}, nR,2b, h}SIGuh sent by each h ∈ H does not
depend on b by the above.
– The additional inputs to A since his last output are messages µh2b, h ∈ H , shown
above to be independent of b. Thus the messages µi2b, i ∈ D, received by h ∈ H are
independent of b.
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– The messages µh2b, h ∈ H , received by h′ ∈ H are shown above to be independent of
b.
– GOh is set to FALSE if h receives an invalid opening or an opening to an invalid cipher-
text, h ∈ H . Thus GOh still does not depend on b by the above.
• Phase 3:
– Whether C ′2 fails depends on Z2, on the partially decrypted ciphertexts C ′′α and C ′′β , and
on the ciphertexts h1 receives during the shuffle. Z2, C ′′α, and C ′′β are shown above to
be independent of b. If h1 = 1, then the received ciphertexts are in the openings of the
message committments from the previous phases. These are shown above not to depend
on b. If h1 > 1, then these ciphertexts are from the adversary in this phase, and since his
last output, the adversary has only received as additional input messages from honest
users that are independent of b, as shown above. Thus the outputs of A continue to be
independent of b. In either case, therefore, the probability that C ′2 fails is independent
of b.
– h ∈ H chooses a permutation pih to apply to the elements of the ciphertext vector it
receives in this phase. pih is chosen independently of b.
– The behavior of h1 depends on Z2, which has been shown to be independent of b.
∗ Case 1: Z2 = 0. A message is only sent by h1 if C ′2 does not fail, which itself only
happens whenC ′′α andC ′′β appear exactly once each among the received ciphertexts.
In this case, h1 replaces these by {C ′α}ON :Oh1+1 and {C ′β}ON :Oh1+1 , where the
keys used are those received by the α and β, respectively. If the encryption keys
received by α and β do not match, then α and β will send different broadcast
hashes to h1 in Phase 4, and C ′2 will fail by Phase 6. Assuming C ′2 does not fail,
the replacements C ′2 makes for C ′′α and C ′β are mb and mb¯, respectively, multiply
encrypted in the same way. C ′2 simply decrypts the rest of the received ciphertexts
using its outer private key.
The received ciphertexts are received fromA, which has not received any messages
since the last phase. Therefore the above shows that these ciphertexts are indepen-
dent of b. The permutation pih1 used in the vector ~Ch1 is uniformly random. Thus,
regardless of b, ~Ch1 contains in a random order m0 and m1 encrypted in the same
way as well as the decryptions of the rest of the received ciphertexts. Therefore,
assuming C ′2 has not and will not fail, the message µh13 sent by h1 is independent
of b.
∗ Case 2: Z2 = 1. The message µh13 sent by h1 depends on pih1 ,Osech1 , messages
from the previous phases, and messages from the adversary in this phase. These
are all shown above to be independent of b.
– The message µi3 from member i > h1 depends on the messages from previous phases
and messages in this phase from members j < i. We have shown above that messages
from previous phases are independent of b. We inductively assume that messages in
this phase from j < i are independent of b. For i ∈ D, the only additional inputs A
has received since the last phase are µj3, j < i, and therefore its outputs continue to
be independent of b. For i ∈ H , µi3 contains the permutation and decryption of the
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ciphertexts received by i in µ(i−1)3. The permutation pii and decryption key Oseci used
are shown above to be independent of b. Therefore µi3 is independent of b.
– GOh, h ∈ H , may be set to FALSE depending on the ciphertexts in µh3. This message is
shown above to be independent of b, and so GOh remains independent of b.
– The messages µh3, h ∈ H received by h′ ∈ H are shown above to be independent of b.
• Phase 4:
– C ′2 fails if Z2 = 0 and either α or β received a vector ~CN that didn’t contain both inner
ciphertexts C ′α and C ′β at least once. If encryption keys received by α and β match,
then the set {C ′α, C ′β} contains m0 and m1 encrypted in the same way, and thus it does
not depend on b. ~CN and Z2 are shown above to be independent of b. Therefore, if the
encryption keys of α and β match, whether or not C ′2 fails is independent of b. If those
encryption keys don’t match, then C ′2 will fail in Phase 6 regardless of b. The keys are
received in an earlier phase, and so it follows from above that whether or not they match
is independent of b.
– GOh, h ∈ H\{α, β}, is updated depending on the inner ciphertext C ′h, µN3, the fail
flag fh, and GOh itself, all of which are shown above to be independent of b. Thus GOh
remains independent of b.
– The update to GOh, h ∈ {α, β}, depends onZ2, which is shown above to be independent
of b, as follows:
∗ Case 1: Z2 = 0. In this case, if the ciphertext vector ~CN sent to both α and β does
not contain both the inner ciphertexts of α and β, then C ′2 will fail. Assuming that
C ′2 does not fail, both GOα and GOβ get set to FALSE if the fail flag is fh = TRUE,
and otherwise keep any existing FALSE value or get a new value of TRUE. They
thus remain independent of b.
∗ Case 2: Z2 = 1. For h ∈ {α, β}, GOh is updated depending on fh, the message
µN3 received by h, on C ′h, and on GOh itself. In this case, the inner ciphertext C
′
h is
shown above to be independent of b. Likewise, fh, µN3 and GOh are shown above
to be independent of b.
– The message µh4 = {GOh, HASHkh{ ~B}, nR,4, h}SIGuh , h ∈ H , does not depend on b
by the above.
– The additional inputs to A since his last output are messages µh4, h ∈ H , shown above
to be independent of b. Thus the messages µi4, i ∈ D, received by h ∈ H are indepen-
dent of b.
– The messages µh4, h ∈ H , received by h′ ∈ H are shown above to be independent of b.
• Phase 5:
– Whether C ′2 fails in this phase depends on Z2 and on the messages sent and received
by h1. These are shown above to be independent of b, and thus failure in this phase is
independent of b also.
– The message µh5 sent by h ∈ H and several internal variables are set differently de-
pending on the messages µi4 sent and received by h, which are shown above to be
independent of b, as follows:
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∗ Case 1: h receives all GOi = TRUE and HASHkh{ ~Bi} = HASHkh{ ~Bh}.
· The message µh5 = {Isech , nR,5, h}SIGuh does not depend on b by the above.
· SUCCESSh depends on the messages sent and received up to and including
this phase. These messages are shown above to be independent of b, and thus
SUCCESSh is also.
· M ′h depends on SUCCESSh and on the messages sent and received up to and
including this phase. All of these are shown above to be independent of b, and
thus M ′h is also.
∗ Case 2: h receives some GOi = FALSE or HASHkh{ ~Bi} 6= HASHkh{ ~Bh}.
· The message µh5 = {0, ~S, nR,5, h}SIGuh does not depend on b by the above.
· SUCCESSh is set to FALSE, and thus is independent of b.
– The additional inputs to A since his last output are messages µh5, h ∈ H , shown above
to be independent of b. Thus the messages µi5, i ∈ D, received by h ∈ H are indepen-
dent of b.
– The messages µh5, h ∈ H , received by h′ ∈ H are shown above to be independent of b.
• Phase 6:
– Whether C ′2 fails in this phase assuming the encryption keys of α and β match (a case
already covered above) depends on Z2 and on the messages sent and received by h1.
These are shown above to be independent of b, and thus failure in this phase under the
matching-keys assumption is independent of b also.
– The message µh6 sent by h ∈ H is created differently depending on SUCCESSh and the
messages sent and received before this phase. These are shown above to be independent
of b, and so the relevant case is independent of b as well.
∗ Case 1: SUCCESSh = TRUE. The message µh6 = {~T , nR,6, h}SIGuh sent by h
depends only on messages sent and received in previous phases. They are shown
above to be independent of b, and thus µh6 is as well.
∗ Case 2: SUCCESSh = FALSE, and for all i GOi = TRUE and HASHkh{ ~Bi} =
HASHkh{ ~Bh}. The message µh6 = {~T , nR,6, h}SIGuh sent by h depends only
on messages sent and received in previous phases. They are shown above to be
independent of b, and thus µh6 is as well.
∗ Case 3: SUCCESSh = FALSE, and for some i GOi = FALSE or HASHkh{ ~Bi} 6=
HASHkh{ ~Bh}. The message µh6 = {Osech , pih, ~T , nR,6, h}SIGuh sent by h de-
pends on messages sent and received in previous phases as well as some internal
variables, all of which are shown above to be independent of b.
– The additional inputs to A since his last output are messages µh6, h ∈ H , shown above
to be independent of b. Thus the messages µi6, i ∈ D, received by h ∈ H are indepen-
dent of b.
– The messages µh6, h ∈ H , received by h′ ∈ H are shown above to be independent of b.
– The outputs and some internal variables are set differently depending on SUCCESSh
and the messages sent and received before this phase. These are shown above to be
independent of b, and so the relevant case is independent of b as well.
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∗ Case 1: SUCCESSh = TRUE. The output Oh = (SUCCESS,M ′h) is shown above to
be independent of b.
∗ Case 2: SUCCESSh = FALSE, and for all i GOi = TRUE and HASHkh{ ~Bi} =
HASHkh{ ~Bh}.
· BLAMEh is set based only on messages sent and received up to this point and
thus by the above is independent of b.
· Log `h includes the output of SETUP-S and all messages sent and received by
h and thus is independent of b by the above.
· The output Oh = (FAILURE, BLAMEh, `h) is shown above to be independent
of b.
∗ Case 3: SUCCESSh = FALSE, and for some i GOi = FALSE or HASHkh{ ~Bi} 6=
HASHkh{ ~Bh}.
· BLAMEh is set based only on messages sent and received up to this point and
thus by the above is independent of b.
· Log `h includes the output of SETUP-S and all messages sent and received by
h and thus is independent of b by the above.
· The output Oh = (FAILURE, BLAMEh, `h) is shown above to be independent
of b.
Finally, we are able to prove that the messages, outputs, and failures of C ′2 are independent of b.
The above analysis shows that the probability of failure does not depend on b. This implies that the
probability that the messages M and outputs O of honest members take their constant failure values
independently of b as well. When C ′2 does not fail, the above analysis shows that all messages and
outputs from honest members are determined independently of b. Thus
Pr[M = m∧O = o∧ F ′2 = f |I = i∧ b = 0] = Pr[M = m∧O = o∧ F ′2 = f |I = i∧ b = 1].
We use this independence from b of the challenge shuffle’s messages, outputs, and failure to
prove that the adversary has no advantage in Game 2.
Lemma 9. ∆(G2) = 0.
Proof. To prove this, we show that the steps of the anonymity game surrounding the challenge
shuffle are independent of b and use the previous lemma for the challenge shuffle itself.
1. In Step 1, the protocol executions are independent of b.
2. In Step 2, the all messages to the adversary have been independent of b, and so the users and
messages A sends to C2 for the challenge run are independent of b.
3. In Step 3, the challenger should assign the challenge messages to the correct challenge users,
depending on b. However, we have modified the challenger to create Game 2 such that this is
not necessary, and so we can omit this step.
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4. During the challenge run in Step 4, C2 first executes SETUP-S using as input the honest mem-
bers’ long-term signature verification keys, which are independent of b, as are the previous
messages to A, and so the output (nR,K, L) of SETUP-S is independent of b. C2 then calls
C ′2 with inputs I = (α, β,mc0,mc1, {mh}h∈H\{α,β}, nR,K, τ) and b. I is determined by
previous messages from A and the outputs of SETUP-S. These have been shown to be inde-
pendent of b, and thus I is as well. We can then apply Lemma 8 to conclude that the joint
distribution of shuffle failure and messages to A are independent of b.
5. If C ′2 didn’t fail, which as shown occurs independently of b, then C2 executes Step 5 of the
anonymity game by executing additional protocol executions. These depend on messages
from A, and all messages to A have been shown independent of b. Thus these executions are
independent of b.
6. The adversary’s guess bˆ in Step 6 depends on the messages to A and the possible failure of
C2. These have been shown to be independent of b, and so bˆ is independent of b.
G2(b) depends on F 2 and bˆ. These have been shown to be independent of b, and thus
Pr[G2(1) = 1] = Pr[G2(0) = 1].
Theorem 5. The GMP-SHUFFLE protocol maintains anonymity with k colluding members for any
0 ≤ k ≤ N − 2.
Proof. Let A be a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary. Let the change in advantage between
Games i and j be ij =
∣∣∆(Gj)−∆(Gi)∣∣. By Lemma 5, the advantage of A in the anonymity
game with GMP-SHUFFLE is negligibly close to 2∆(G0) ≤ 2(01 + 12 + ∆(G2)). 01 is negligible
by Lemma 6, 12 is negligible by Lemma 7, and ∆(G2)=0 by Lemma 9. Thus the advantage of A
in the anonymity game with GMP-SHUFFLE is negligible.
8.4.2 The GMP-Bulk Protocol
We show that the adversary’s advantage in winning the anonymity game with GMP-BULK is negli-
gible by proving that the game’s advantage changes negligibly between neighboring games and is
zero in the final game. We incorporate the anonymity proof for the shuffle by using that sequence
of games (extended to GMP-BULK) as game subsequences modifying the challenger during the bulk
protocol’s shuffle phases.
We define Game 0, Game 1, and Game 2 by changing the behavior of C during the message-
descriptor shuffle in Phase 3. The changes are essentially the same as those made in Game 0, Game
1, and Game 2, respectively, in the shuffle anonymity proof (Section 8.4.1). We then similarly define
Game 3, Game 4, and Game 5 by applying the same sequence of changes to the blame shuffle in
Phase 7. We replace the encrypted seeds sent in the message descriptors of α and β with unrelated
ciphertexts to define Game 6. Finally, in Game 7, we replace the pseudorandom bit streams sent
during data transmission with random streams.
Let Zi1 and Z
i
2 indicate that challenger C
i guesses that h1 should release her outer private key
at some point as part of the message descriptor shuffle (Phase 3) and the blame shuffle (Phase 7),
respectively. Let F i indicate whether or not the challenger failed in Game i.
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Game 0: We create a challenger C0 that sets Z01 ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random as a guess
about if h1 should reveal an outer private key during the message-descriptor shuffle (Phase 3) of the
challenge run in the bulk anonymity game. C0 fails if his guess proves to be wrong or if a hash
collision is observed during the shuffle. Otherwise he behaves the same as the anonymity-game
challenger. These failure points are exactly the same (using Z01 in place of Z
0) as those defining C0
for Game 0 of the shuffle anonymity analysis (Section 8.4.1), and so we do not repeat them here.
Again, when failure occurs, F 0 = 1, C0 terminates, and the game output G0 is set to a uniformly
random bit. In every other case, F 0 = 0, C0 behaves exactly as C would.
Game 1: We again reuse the changes described in the shuffle anonymity analysis. We create
challenger C1 by applying the changes that define C1 for Game 1 of the shuffle analysis to the
challenger C0 defined above. These changes are made to the Phase 3 shuffle of the challenge run
in the bulk anonymity game. Everywhere Z1 appears in these changes, we instead use Z11 , and
everywhere mcb appears, we instead use the shuffle input of α (which is a message descriptor).
These changes effectively replace a ciphertext containing the message descriptor of α with one that
contains a dummy message until it has been shuffled by the first honest member.
Game 2: As in the shuffle anonymity analysis, this game is created from Game 1 above in the
same way that Game 1 itself was created from Game 0, except replacing Z11 with Z
2
1 , α with β, and
the shuffle input of α with the shuffle input of β. This effectively replaces a ciphertext containing
the message descriptor of β with one that contains a dummy message until it has been shuffled by
the first honest member.
Games 3–5: These games further modify the challenger by adapting and applying the sequence
of changes given in the shuffle anonymity analysis as was done to define Games 0–2 above. This
time, however, we apply the changes to the blame shuffle (Phase 7) of the challenge protocol run.
In addition, the guess bit is denoted Zi2, and the shuffle inputs to α and β are accusations rather than
message descriptors.
Game 6: We define challenger C6 from C5 by changing the inputs to the message-descriptor
shuffle of the challenge run. During the generation of message descriptors (Phase 2), we replace the
encrypted seeds Sαβ and Sβα with the encryption of new random seeds. Specifically,
1. For α, we replace the encrypted seed it creates for β in Case 1 of Phase 2 with an encryption
of the new random seed s′αβ . That is, we set Sαβ = {s′αβ}yβ , where the encryption key is
among those α received in Phase 1a. Note that the original seed sαβ is still created and used
to generate the ciphertext Cαβ .
2. For β, we replace the encrypted seed it creates for α in Case 1 of Phase 2 with an encryption
of the new random seed s′βα. That is, we set Sβα = {s′βα}yα , where the encryption key is
among those β received in Phase 1a. Again, note that the original seed sβα is still created and
otherwise used as before.
Then during data transmission (Phase 4), C6 recognizes the seeds that match s′αβ and s
′
βα among
those received by β and α, respectively, and simply uses the original seeds to generate the necessary
ciphertexts. More precisely, for α, in Case 2 of Phase 4, whenever a value Siα received by α
decrypts to a seed that the challenger recognizes is identical to s′βα, α sets Ciα to the ciphertext Cβα
that was generated earlier from sβα. A similar action is taken for β, where this time the challenger
looks for decrypted seeds matching s′αβ and uses Cαβ for the ciphertext.
Game 7: We construct challenger C7 from C6 by replacing some pseudorandomness with true
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randomness during the challenge protocol run. For α and β, in Case 1 of Phase 2 (descriptor gener-
ation), the ciphertexts Cαβ and Cβα, respectively, are chosen uniformly at random rather than being
generated pseudorandomly. Note that these random ciphertexts are then used in the computation
of Cαα and Cββ , respectively. Then in Case 2 of Phase 4 (data transmission), α and β use these
random sequences as ciphertexts. That is, α sends the random Cβα generated in Phase 2 for every
decrypted seed siα that matches s′βα. Similarly, β sends the random Cαβ generated in Phase 2 for
every decrypted seed siβ that matches s′αβ .
The following lemma shows that, as in the shuffle proof, the output’s advantage in Game 0 is





∣∣∣Pr [AC(0) = 1]− Pr [AC(1) = 1]∣∣∣ .
Proof. The proof of this lemma is almost exactly the same as the proof of Lemma 5. We simply
interpret each reference to a phase of the challenge shuffle as instead referring to a phase of the
message-descriptor shuffle in the bulk protocol. We also replace Z0 everywhere it appears with
Z01 .
The next lemma shows that, as in the shuffle proof, the ciphertext changes from Game 0 to
Game 2 can only change the advantage of the game output by a negligible amount.
Lemma 11.
∣∣∆(G2)−∆(G0)∣∣ is negligible.
Proof. Games 1 and 2 are constructed by making essentially the same changes to the challenger’s
behavior during the descriptor shuffle that were made in Games 1 and 2 of the shuffle anonymity
analysis. Thus, the proof that these two sets of changes each only change the output advantage by a
negligible amount is almost exactly the same as the proofs of Lemmas 6 and 7.
In these proofs, a distinguisher D is constructed that simulates either member of a pair of adja-
cent games for the adversary, depending on the hidden bit of the distinguishing game. The proofs
show that this distinguisher converts a non-negligible change in the game output’s advantage to
a non-negligible advantage in the distinguishing game. Such an advantage would contradict the
IND-CCA2 property of the cryptosystem.
We slightly modify the argument of that sort in the proof of Lemma 6 to prove that the output
advantage changes negligibly between Game 0 and Game 1. We construct a distinguisher DB that
is the same as D in that proof with the following differences:
1. In Step 1 of D, DB instead executes the anonymity game up to the challenge run of the bulk
protocol (rather than the shuffle protocol).
2. DB then executes Phase 1 and Phase 2 of bulk protocol exactly, ending up with the inputs of
honest members to shuffle protocol mhi that are constructed during Phase 2.
3. DB continues with Step 2 of D.
4. DB continues with Steps 3–8 of D, replacing mb with mα everywhere.
5. After Step 8 of the distinguisher is finished, the message-descriptor shuffle (i.e. Phase 3) of
the bulk protocol is over, and the DB uses the outputs of the honest members to execute the
rest of the bulk protocol (Phase 4 – Phase 7) as described in the protocol.
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By applying the subsequent arguments of Lemma 6 to DB (again substituting mα for mb in the
arguments), we can show that the game output’s advantage changes negligibly between Game 0 and
Game 1.
We can adapt the distinguisher construction and subsequent arguments of Lemma 7 in the same
way (except using β in place of α and b¯ in place of b) to show that the game output’s advantage
changes negligibly between Game 1 and Game 2.
Game 3 is created by applying the first game transformation of the shuffle proof to the blame
shuffle in Game 2. Thus, as in the shuffle proof, the game advantage decreases by a factor negligibly
close to 1/2:
Lemma 12. ∆(G3) is negligibly close to 12∆(G
2).
Proof. As with Lemma 10, the proof of this lemma is almost exactly the same as the proof of
Lemma 5. We apply that proof to this lemma by interpreting each reference to a phase of the
challenge shuffle as instead referring to a phase of the blame shuffle in the challenge bulk round.
As we are comparing Games 2 and 3 rather than the anonymity game and Game 0, everywhere they
appear we replace C with C2, AC(b) with G2(b), C0 with C3, and Z0 with Z32 . In addition, the
transcripts between A and C2 (i.e. TA,C2) and between A and C3 (i.e. TA,C3) may fall into one
more case than the four given in that proof. The challenger may fail with an incorrect guess Z1
during the descriptor shuffle. The proof of Lemma 10 shows that this failure occurs with probability
1/2 in Game 0, and in Game 2 this failure continues to occur with probability 1/2 and for the same
reasons, namely that each transcript falls into exactly one of the four listed cases, and failure occurs
in each case when the independently random bit Z21 has a certain value. The proof of Lemma 5 can
easily be modified to include this failure case, with the following modified conclusions:
1. Each transcript case occurs with the same probability for TA,C2 and TA,C3 .
2. Failure occurs in every case except for the added one (which always fails) with probability
1/2.
3. The distribution of transcripts in TA,C3 conditional on F 3 = 0 is, in every case except the
added one, the same as the distribution of transcripts in the same case in TA,C2 .
These imply that F 3 = 0 with probability 1/4 and that the conditional distribution of TA,C3 given
F 3 = 0 is the same as the distribution of TA,C2 given that F 2 = 0. The game outputs G3 and G2
are the adversary output when the challenger does not fail and are uniformly random bits otherwise.
Thus∣∣Pr [G3(0) = 1]− Pr [G3(1) = 1]∣∣ = 1
4








∣∣Pr[G2(0) = 1]− Pr[G2(1) = 1]∣∣
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Changing ciphertexts from the challenger from Game 3 to Game 5 has only a negligible effect
on the output advantage, as in the analogous game transitions of the shuffle proof:
Lemma 13.
∣∣∆(G5)−∆(G3)∣∣ is negligible.
Proof. This lemma can be proven using the arguments of Lemma 11 applied to the blame shuffle
rather than the descriptor shuffle. Those construct distinguishers and show that they convert a non-
negligible change in the game output between Games 3 and 4 or between Games 4 and 5 into a
non-negligible advantage in the IND-CCA2 game. This would contradict the IND-CCA2 property
of the cryptosystem.
Game 6 is created from Game 5 by changing some PRNG seeds that are then encrypted and
sent by the challenger. By the IND-CCA2 property of the encryption scheme, this can only have a
negligible effect on the output advantage:
Lemma 14.
∣∣∆(G6)−∆(G5)∣∣ is negligible.
Proof. To prove this lemma, we consider the two ciphertext changes in sequence: i) {sαβ}yβ gets
replaced by {s′αβ}yβ and ii) {sβα}yα gets replaced by {s′βα}yα . For each change, we can construct
a distinguisher that converts a non-negligible change in the game-output distribution into a non-
negligible advantage in the distinguishing game.
Let Game 5a refer to the game that results from just the ciphertext replacement in (i). Let CD be
the challenger in the distinguishing game and bD be the challenge bit. We construct a distinguisher
D that simulates either Game 5 or Game 5a, depending on bD, as follows:
1. D simulates the anonymity-game challenger C5 up to the challenge run of the bulk protocol.
2. To begin Phase 1 of the bulk protocol (key generation), D obtains the public encryption key
KD from CD and sets yβ = KD. D generates the encryption key pairs (xh, yh) for all other
honest users. Then D continues with the rest of Phase 1a (session-key generation) followed
by Phase 1b (key verification), acting as C5 would.
3. D executes Phase 2 (descriptor generation) for α as follows:
Case 1: If key verification is successful (Case 1 of Phase 2), D executes the phase for α as
C5 would up to the point at which Sαβ is assigned. At this point, D randomly chooses a
new seed s′αβ , submits (sαβ, s
′
αβ) to CD, receives cbD as a response, and sets Sαβ = cbD . D
executes the rest of the phase for α as C5 would.
Case 2: If key verification fails (Case 2 of Phase 2), D executes the phase for α as C5 would.
Case 3: This case will never execute for α because α has message mb to send.
D executes Phase 2 for the other honest members as C5 would.
4. D executes Phase 3 as C5 would.
5. D executes Phase 4 (data transmission) for β as follows:
Case 1: If the descriptor shuffle failed (Case 1 of Phase 4), D executes the phase for β as C5
would.
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Case 2: Otherwise the descriptors were successfully received (Case 2 of Phase 2). For each
encrypted seed Siβ received by β in a descriptor, if Siβ matches the encrypted seed Sαβ = cbD
created by α for β, then D sets siβ to the seed sαβ chosen by α in Phase 2, rather than
obtaining it by decrypting Siβ . Otherwise, D sends Siβ to CD for decryption, receiving s in
response. If s = s′αβ , then set siβ = sαβ , and otherwise set siβ = s. D completes the phase
as C5 would.
D executes this phase for the other honest members as C5 would.
6. D executes Phase 5 (acknowledgement submission) and Phase 6 (message recovery) as C5
would.
7. D executes Phase 7 (blame) as C5 would. It will never be required for D to produce the
random bits used to produce Sαβ , which it would be unable to do, because β only sends
ciphertexts with correct hashes for slots with the descriptors of honest members.
8. D executes the rest of the anonymity game after the challenge run as C5 would.
9. D uses G as its guess bˆD.
We observe that, except with negligible probability, D simulates C5 if bD = 0 (i.e. if cbD =
{sαβ}yβ ), and D simulates C5a if bD = 1. Note that, depending on bD, D creates a message
descriptor for α that contains as a seed for β either the encryption of sαβ or of s′αβ . Moreover, if
bD = 1, D correctly uses sαβ for all encrypted seeds received by β that match s′αβ , and, if bD = 0,
the probability that β receives an encryption of s′αβ and (incorrectly) uses sαβ as the decryption is
negligible because s′αβ is never used in the simulation up to that point and is chosen independently
at random. In addition, the ciphertexts sent to the decryption oracle never match the forbidden text
cbD = Sαβ because in those cases the decryptions are copied directly from the seed created by α
for β. In every other way, C5 and C5a act the same, and D simulates their behavior.
The output ofD is the game outputG(b), where b is the challenge bit of the simulated anonymity
game. G(b) is set exactly as it is by the simulated challenger except with negligible probability, and
thus the advantage of D is negligibly close to the change in G(b) for any b. That is,∣∣∣Pr[bˆD = 1|bD = 0]− Pr[bˆD = 1|bD = 1]∣∣∣− ∣∣Pr[G5(b) = 1]− Pr[G5a(b) = 1]∣∣
is negligible. Because the advantage in the distinguishing game is negligible by the IND-CCA2
property of the cryptosystem, the change in the output distribution between Game 5 and Game 5a
for a given value of b must be negligible. This implies that the change in the output advantage is
also negligible.
Applying ciphertext replacement (ii) to Game 5a results in Game 6. Essentially the same ar-
gument as above (simply swapping α and β everywhere) shows that the output advantage changes
negligibly as a result of this replacement.
Thus the output advantage changes negligibly between Game 5 and Game 6.
We create Game 7 from Game 6 by replacing some pseudorandom streams with random streams.




Proof. Consider the changes made to C6 in the following sequence: i) β chooses the ciphertext
Cβα in Phase 2 randomly instead of pseudorandomly, and α uses that ciphertext in Phase 4; and
ii) α chooses the ciphertext Cαβ in Phase 2 randomly instead of pseudorandomly, and β uses that
ciphertext in Phase 4. Let Game 6a be the game defined by applying (i) to Game 6. Game 7 is then
(ii) applied to Game 6a. We can show that the game output changes negligibly for each pair in this
short sequence by constructing a distinguisher that converts a change in the game output probability
to the same advantage in the pseudorandomness game.
Let CR be the challenger in the pseudorandomness game, and let bR be its challenge bit. Dis-
tinguisher D interacts with CR to simulate either Game 6 or Game 6a for the adversary, depending
on bR. Let D behave as follows:
1. D executes the anonymity game as C6 would up to the challenge run of the bulk protocol.
2. D executes Phase 1 as C6 would.
3. In Phase 2, D receives r from CR. For member β, D sets Cβα = r in Case 1 and otherwise
executes the phase for β as C6 would. D executes Phase 2 for all other honest members as
C6 would.
4. D executes Phase 3 as C6 would.
5. In Phase 4, for member α, D sets Cjα = r for all decrypted seeds siα that are identical to
the seed s′βα generated by β. D otherwise executes Phase 4 for β as C
6 would. D executes
Phase 4 for all other honest members as C6 would.
6. D executes Phase 5, Phase 6, and Phase 7 as C6 would.
7. D executes the rest of the anonymity game after the challenge run.
8. D uses the game output of the simulated challenger as guess bˆR.
We observe that if bR = 0 (i.e. r is pseudorandomly generated by CR from an unknown random
seed s), then D simulates Game 6, and if bR = 1, then D simulates Game 6a. In particular, D
can execute the blame phase without knowing the seed that is used to generate r, if any, because
the encrypted seed included in the descriptor dβ is already an unrelated seed s′βα. Also, the chal-
lenger creates the encrypted seeds in both games, and so any accusation can be correctly generated,
although because β only generates accusations for slots with its own descriptor dβ , and α always
produces correct ciphertexts when using dβ , it should in fact never be the case that β generates an
accusation involving the ciphertexts changed between Game 6 and Game 6a.
The guess bit bˆR of D is thus G6 when bR = 0 and G6a when bR = 1. Therefore if the differ-
ence between Pr[G6(b) = 1] and Pr[G6a(b) = 1] were non-negligible for some b, then D could
achieve a non-negligible advantage in the pseudorandomness game. This would contradict pseudo-
randomness, and thus the change in the output advantage from Game 6 to Game 6a is negligible.
A nearly identical argument, simply swapping α and β everywhere, shows that there is a negli-
gible change in the game advantage from Game 6a to Game 7 as well. Thus, the change in the game
advantage from Game 6 to Game 7 is negligible.
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By Game 7, the adversary has the same view whether m0 belongs to α or β, and thus there is
no advantage in the game output. In order to show this, we follow the approach of Lemmas 8 and
9, and we view the challenger C7 as calling a subroutine C ′7 to execute ANONYMIZE-B during the
challenge run. This allows a natural decomposition of the proof, and it also us to express the fact
that in addition to the messages to the adversary, the outputs of the bulk protocol are independent
of b. Thus if, for example, the members decide later to come to a consensus about the results of
the bulk protocol, that information will not break anonymity. C ′7 takes as input the challenge bit




1, {mh}h∈H\{α,β}). C ′7 either fails or returns output
O = (Oh1 , . . . , ON−k), where Oh is the output of ANONYMIZE-B for member h. C7 fails if and
only if C ′7 fails.
In addition, we viewC ′7 as executing the descriptor and blame shuffles by calling as a subroutine
the challenger C ′2 as defined in Section 8.4.1 for use in Lemma 8. C ′7 uses as inputs to C ′2 the
same K, α, β, and τ that itself received. It uses nR1 as the round nonce input for the descriptor
shuffle (i.e. Phase 3) and nR2 as the round nonce input for the blame shuffle (i.e. Phase 7). The
member messages and fail flags are determined from its own inputs as described in the bulk protocol
description. For the descriptor shuffle, we denote by mc10 and m
c1
1 the challenge messages, by m
1
h
the non-challenge messages, and by f1h the fail flags. For the blame shuffle, we denote by m
c2
0 and
mc21 the challenge messages, bym
2
h the non-challenge messages, and by f
2
h the fail flags. We denote
by O1 = (O1h1 , . . . , O
1
hN−k) the output of the descriptor shuffle and by O
2 = (O2h1 , . . . , O
2
hN−k)
the output of the blame shuffle. C ′7 fails if one of the two invocations of C ′2 fails.
Let M be the transcript of all messages between members during the protocol. Let F ′7 be the
event that C ′7 fails. When F ′7 = 1, O and M are defined to take a constant failure value. The
following lemma shows that changing b does not change the joint distribution of M , O, and F ′7.
Lemma 16.
Pr[M = m∧O = o∧ F ′7 = f |I = i∧ b = 0] = Pr[M = m∧O = o∧ F ′7 = f |I = i∧ b = 1].
Proof. To prove this, we track the dependence on b of messages from C ′7 to A, internal variables
of C ′7, and outputs of C ′7. This analysis will show that the messages and outputs of C ′7 follow the
same distribution regardless of b. In order to do this despite the dependence of some variables on
b, we will consider two parallel executions of the challenge round, one in which b = 0 and one in
which b = 1. The messages, variables, and outputs that do not depend on b will indeed be the same
in the two executions. The variables that do depend on b may have different states between the two
executions, but the probability of those paired states will be the same.
We consider these executions step-by-step as follows:
• Phase 1a:
– Encryption keys (xh, yh) are generated independently of b.
– The message µh1a from h ∈ H is independent of b by the above.
– The additional inputs to A since his last output are messages µh1a, h ∈ H , shown
above to be independent of b. Thus the messages µi1a, i ∈ D, received by h ∈ H are
independent of b.




– The message µh1b = { ~Keh, nR,1b, h}SIGuh from h ∈ H contain keys received from
other members and thus is independent of b by the above.
– The additional inputs to A since his last output are messages µh1b, h ∈ H , shown
above to be independent of b. Thus the messages µi1b, i ∈ D, received by h ∈ H are
independent of b.
– The messages µh1b, h ∈ H , received by h′ ∈ H are shown above to be independent of
b.
• Phase 2: We consider several cases for how challenge members form descriptors. These
cases depend on the keys that honest members received in the previous phases, and thus by
the above the applicable case does not depend on b.
– Case 1: All honest members received valid and matching keys in the previous phases. In
this case, the descriptors dα and dβ do depend on b, and so we compare their generation
when b = 0 and when b = 1. We observe that the descriptor for the challenge member
h ∈ {α, β} assigned m0 is created the same regardless of whether h is α or β. A seed
is chosen uniformly at random for each member i, it is encrypted to produce Shi using
the same set of keys (as assumed for this case), and the randomness of the encryption is
saved as Rhi. Ciphertexts Chi are produced for all i ∈ G\{α, β} using the PRNG with
the seed generated for i. The ciphertext Chα is chosen randomly, and Chβ is chosen
such that the XOR of all ciphertexts yields m0. The descriptor is then created from the
encrypted seeds, hashes of the ciphertexts, and the length of m0. To emphasize that
the creation of the descriptor depends on the message rather than its owner, we use the
additional notation of sm0i for the seeds, Rm0i for the encryption randomness, Cm0i for
the ciphertexts, and dm0 for the descriptor. The descriptor for the challenge member
assigned m1 is similarly generated, and we use similar user-independent notation for it
and its components. Thus, for specific dm0 and dm1 , the probability that dα = dm0 and
dβ = dm1 when b = 0 is the same as the probability that dα = dm1 and dβ = dm0 when
b = 1. We thus let the former occur in the execution under consideration for b = 0 and
the latter occur in the execution for b = 1.
– Case 2: Some honest member h received an invalid key or non-matching keys in the
previous rounds. In this case, C ′7 will use f1h = TRUE as an input to C
′2 and thus cause
the shuffle to fail. If Z71 = 0, the challenger has guessed wrong, and the challenger will
fail. Assuming the challenger does not fail, Z71 = 1, and so the descriptors of α and β
are never needed (the dummy message is preserved throughout the shuffle). Thus we
assume that C7 does not create them at all.
– Member h ∈ H\{α, β} creates her descriptor dh in a way that only depends on her
input message and the keys she received in the previous rounds. It is shown above that
neither of these depends on b, and so her descriptor does not depend on b.
• Phase 3:
– Each h ∈ H sets the fail flag f1h for the shuffle in this phase based on keys received in
previous rounds, and thus it is independent of b by the above.
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– C ′7 calls C ′2. The inputs to C ′2 are challenge users α and β, challenge messagesmc10 =
dm0 and m
c1
1 = dm1 , non-challenge messages m
1
h = dh for h ∈ H\{α, β}, round
number nR1 , signing keys K, member ordering τ , fail flags f
1
h , and challenge bit b. As
shown above, all of the inputs to C ′2 except b are independent of b. Thus with I set to
all those inputs except b we can apply Lemma 8. We conclude that C ′7 fails in this step
with probability independent of b, that the messages sent are independent of b, and that
the output O1 is independent of b.
– The message µh3 = {p′, nR,3, h}SIGuh from h ∈ H contains evidence of invalid or
non-matching keys if any are received. Thus it depends only on messages received in
previous rounds and is independent of b by the above.
– The additional inputs to A since his last output are messages µh3, h ∈ H , shown above
to be independent of b. Thus the messages µi3, i ∈ D, received by h ∈ H are indepen-
dent of b.
– The messages µh3, h ∈ H , received by h′ ∈ H are shown above to be independent of b.
• Phase 4:
– For each member h ∈ H , we consider two cases for the message she sends. Which case
applies depends on the shuffle output O1h. O
1
h is shown above to be independent of b,
and so the relevant case is independent of b.
∗ Case 1: O1h = (FAILURE, BLAMEs1h , `s1h ). h sends message
µh4 = {FALSE, BLAMEs1h , `s1h , nR,4, h}SIGuh , which is independent of b by the
above.
∗ Case 2 O1h = (SUCCESS,M ′s1h ). h sends message
µh4 = {TRUE, C ′pi(1)h, . . . , C ′pi(N)h, nR,4, h}SIGuh . For h ∈ H\{α, β}, C ′pi(i)h
is computed from the descriptors and keys received in earlier rounds, which are
shown above to be independent of b. For h ∈ {α, β}, h uses as its ciphertext the
valueCm0h generated in Phase 2 for descriptors containing the encryption of a seed
matching the seed that is encrypted in dm0 . h does similarly for descriptors with
seeds matching the one in dm1 . Otherwise, h computes ciphertexts C
′
pi(i)h from the
descriptors and keys received in earlier rounds. Cm0h and Cm1h are created above
independently of b, and the previous messages received by h are shown above to be
independent of b. Thus, the message µh4 from h is independent of b.
– The additional inputs to A since his last output are messages µh4, h ∈ H , shown above
to be independent of b. Thus the messages µi4, i ∈ D, received by h ∈ H are indepen-
dent of b.
– The messages µh4, h ∈ H , received by h′ ∈ H are shown above to be independent of b.
• Phase 5:
– The message µh5 = {~Vh, nR,5, h}SIGuh sent by h ∈ H depends on the descriptors di
obtained as an output of the shuffle, on GOi received from each member i, and on the
ciphertexts C ′ij received from each member i. These messages and outputs are shown
above to be independent of b, and thus µh5 is independent of b as well.
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– The additional inputs to A since his last output are messages µh5, h ∈ H , shown above
to be independent of b. Thus the messages µi5, i ∈ D, received by h ∈ H are indepen-
dent of b.
– The messages µh5, h ∈ H , received by h′ ∈ H are shown above to be independent of b.
• Phase 6: Member h ∈ H creates message m′i using the GOj and the ciphertexts C ′ij received
from each member j. Each of these is shown above to be independent of b, and so m′i is also
independent of b.
• Phase 7:
– Each h ∈ H sets the fail flag f2h for the shuffle in this phase based on ciphertexts
received in the messages µj4 and µj5 from every j. These messages are shown above to
be independent of b, and thus each f2h is independent of b.
– C ′7 calls C ′2. The inputs to C ′2 from C ′7 are challenge users α and β, challenge
messages mc20 and m
c2
1 (to be specified), non-challenge messages m
2
h = Ah for h ∈
H\{α, β}, round number nR2 , signing keys K, member ordering τ , fail flags f2h , and
challenge bit b. We observe here that α, β, nR2 , K, τ , and the f
2
h are shown above to be
independent of b. We consider two separate cases for the blame shuffle in order to show
that all failures, messages, and outputs of the shuffle are independent of b. Which case
applies depends only on the f2h and thus is independent of b.
∗ Case 1: f2h = FALSE for all h ∈ H .
It is shown above that all inputs to C ′2 are independent of b except mc20 , m
c2
1 ,
m2h = Ah, h ∈ H\{α, β}, and b itself. Each accusation Ah, h ∈ H\{α, β},
depends on the descriptor dh, the shuffle output O1h and the contents of the µj4
received by h from all j. These are shown above to be independent of b, and so Ah
is independent of b as well.
We claim that the accusation Am0 created by the member h0 ∈ {α, β} that is
assigned m0 is created the same regardless of h0. After showing this, we will be




~Vh0 , and dh0 .




h ) for some h ∈ {α, β}, then neither α nor β
creates an accusation, and Am0 = 0
Λa regardless of h0.
Now suppose that O1h = (SUCCESS,M
′s1
h ) for all h ∈ {α, β}. We observe that,
although C ′2 does not strictly execute ANONYMIZE-S, after Phase 3 of the shuffle
that challenger does simply execute ANONYMIZE-S for each h ∈ H , assuming
that he does not fail. If C ′2 had failed during the descriptor shuffle, of course, we
would not have reached this phase, and therefore we can assume that he did not.
In addition, the outcome is the same as if the entire GMP-SHUFFLE had been run
because all f2h = FALSE by assumption and the parameters K, τ , and nR1 used for
ANONYMIZE-S are generated by SETUP-B in the same way that SETUP-S generates
them. Thus, we observe that Theorem 1 applies to the descriptor shuffle. We are
therefore guaranteed that the outputs (SUCCESS,M ′s1h ), h ∈ {α, β}, are identical.
We can then assume that O1α = (SUCCESS,M
′s1
α ) = O
1
β .
If α receives a µj4 with GOj = FALSE, then β must as well. Otherwise, the equivo-
cation would have been discovered and the shuffle deliberately failed by all honest
62
members, contradicting our assumption for this case. The accusation for both mem-
bers in this case is empty, and so we can say that Am0 = 0
Λa regardless of h0.
If α and β receive GOj = TRUE in all µj4, then any incorrect ciphertexts α receives
in µj4 must also be received by β. Otherwise, again, all honest users would have
noticed the equivocation and caused the blame shuffle to fail, contradicting the case




GOj and incorrect Cij contained in each µj4 received by h0. We have shown that
in this case all of these are equal for α and β, and thus Am0 is indeed created the
same regardless of h0.
The above arguments apply to the accusation Am1 created by the user h1 ∈ {α, β}
that is assigned m1. Therefore, with mc20 = Am0 , m
c2
1 = Am1 , and I as the set of
all inputs from C ′7 to C ′2 except b, we can apply Lemma 8. We conclude that C ′2
fails during the blame shuffle with probability independent of b, that the messages
sent to A are independent of b, and that the output O2 is independent of b.
∗ Case 2: f2h = 1 for some h ∈ H .
In this case, we simply view C7 as calling C ′2 withAh = h for all h ∈ H . Because
the shuffle will fail, the challenger will fail if Z2 is set to 0. Otherwise, Z2 = 1,
and the shuffle effectively uses h as the input message for each h ∈ H . In this
case, b has no effect on the messages of each user and therefore no effect on the
shuffle. Thus, C ′2 fails during the blame shuffle with probability independent of
b, the messages sent to A during the shuffle are independent of b, and the shuffle
output O2 is independent of b.
– The message µh7 = {p′, nR,7, h}SIGuh sent by h ∈ H depends on f2h and the messages
µi5 and µi4 received by h. These are shown above to be independent of b, and thus µh7
is independent of b as well.
– The additional inputs to A since his last output are messages sent during the blame
shuffle and µh7, h ∈ H , all of which are shown above to be independent of b. Thus the
messages µi7, i ∈ D, received by h ∈ H are independent of b.
– The messages µh7, h ∈ H , received by h′ ∈ H are shown above to be independent of b.
– For each h ∈ H , SUCCESSh and BLAMEh are set differently in several different cases.
Which case applies depends on O2h and µh5, which are shown above to be independent
of b. Thus which case is applied is also independent of b. For each case, SUCCESSh
and BLAMEh depend at most on BLAME
s2
h ; on the messages µi3, µi4, and µi7 sent and
received by h; on the blame-shuffle output O2h; and on the descriptor-shuffle output O
1
h.
These are all shown above to be independent of b, and thus SUCCESSh and BLAMEh are
independent of b as well.
– Output messages M ′h, h ∈ H , are created depending on SUCCESSh and the messages
µi4 sent and received by h. These are shown above to be independent of b, and thus M ′h
is independent of b as well.
– Log `h, h ∈ H , depends on SUCCESSh, the output of SETUP-B, all messages sent and
received by h, and the shuffle outputs O1h and O
2
h. These are all shown above to be
independent of b, and thus `h is independent of b as well.
– The output Oh of GMP-BULK, h ∈ H , depends on SUCCESSh, M ′h, BLAMEh, and `k.
These are shown above to be independent of b, and thus Oh is independent of b as well.
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We have thus shown a bijection between executions of C ′7 with b = 0 and those with b = 1,
given input I = i, such that the members of any given pair of the bijection occur with the same
probability and have the same F ′7, M , and O.
Lemma 17. ∆(G7) = 0.
Proof. To prove this, we show that the steps of the anonymity game surrounding the challenge run
are independent of b and use the previous lemma for the challenge run itself.
1. In Step 1, pre-challenge rounds of the bulk protocol are executed, which do not depend on b.
2. In Step 2, A sends C7 the challenge participants α and β, the challenge messages mc0 and
mc1, and the non-challenge messages mh, h ∈ H\{α, β}, which must be independent of b
because all previous inputs to A were shown above to be independent of b.
3. Step 3 of the anonymity game is for the challenger to assign the messages of the challenge
users according to b. However, we leave these variables undefined, as we have modified the
challenger to create Game 7 such that they are not necessary.
4. The challenge run is executed during Step 4. We observe that C7 first executes SETUP-B.
This protocol takes only the long-term signature verification keys as input, and therefore its
output
(nR, nR1 , nR2 ,K, τ) is independent of b. Next C
7 calls C ′7 with inputs b and




1, {mh}h∈H\{α,β}). I has been shown to be indepen-
dent of b. Therefore, by applying Lemma 16, we can conclude that C7 fails independently of
b, and if it does not fail any messages M to A and outputs O are also independent of b.
5. In Step 5, the challenger executes further rounds of the protocol. The adversary’s inputs up to
this point have been shown to be independent of b, and thus these executions do not depend
on b.
6. In Step 6, A outputs guess bˆ. All inputs to the adversary have been shown to be independent
of b, and thus bˆ is independent of b.
The game output G7(b) only depends on F 7 and bˆ. These have both been shown to be independent
of b, and therefore
Pr[G7(1) = 1] = Pr[G7(0) = 1].
Taken together, the preceding lemmas show that the adversary has a negligible advantage in the
anonymity game:
Theorem 6. The GMP-BULK protocol maintains anonymity with k colluding members for any 0 ≤
k ≤ N − 2.
Proof. Let A be a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary. We denote the change in advantage
between games i and j as ij =
∣∣∆(Gj)−∆(Gi)∣∣ . By Lemmas 10 and 12, the advantage of A in








By Lemma 17 this is 202 + 435 + 456 + 467. This quantity is negligible by Lemmas 11, 13, 14,
and 15.
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9 Conclusion and Future Work
DISSENT is a practical protocol for anonymous and accountable group communication that allows
a well-defined group of participants to efficiently exchange variable-length messages, while re-
sisting traffic analysis and disruption attacks effective against mix-networks, DC-nets, and onion
routing. DISSENT improves upon previous shuffled-send primitives by adding accountability—the
ability to trace misbehaving nodes—and by eliminating the message padding requirements of ear-
lier schemes. DISSENT guarantees anonymity, integrity, and accountability, and has been shown
practical for anonymous communication within moderate-size groups.
We have presented an improved version of this protocol that fixes several flaws in the original
design. In addition, we have expressed the protocol in a modular framework that allows its compo-
nents to be easily reused and analyzed. We have precisely defined its security properties and have
given rigorous proofs that the improved protocol satisfies these properties.
Recent additional work on DISSENT has resulted in two new systems. Dissent in Numbers (Wolin-
sky, Corrigan-Gibbs, Johnson, and Ford 2012) accommodates anonymity sets sizes of thousands of
nodes by offloading the protocols computational burden to a small set of servers. Verdict (Corrigan-
Gibbs, Wolinsky, and Ford 2013) extends this client/server architecture by requiring clients to prove
(in zero-knowledge) the well-formedness of messages they submit to the servers, thus preventing
the certain disruption attacks which affected prior DC-net-based systems. Both protocols, however,
lack rigorous proof of security. Therefore, future work includes a thorough security analysis of the
scalable DISSENT and Verdict. Performing a rigorous security analysis of a complex protocol is a
time-consuming and error-prone task. Hence, we would like to take advantage of formal verification
methods for cryptographic protocols (Meadows 2003), especially for an exhaustive case analysis.
We also wish to express and verify DISSENT’s security properties in the universally composable
(UC) framework (Canetti 2001).
APPENDIX
Here we describe in more detail some of the security flaws discovered in the DISSENT protocol
of Corrigan-Gibbs and Ford (2010). Flaws were discovered affecting each of the desired security
criteria: integrity, anonymity, and accountability. We also briefly mention the technique we adopted
to fix each problem. By following a rigorous proof methodology for the improved protocol, we can
have high confidence that these fixes have not not introduced problems of their own. Note that the
terminology and notation used here is that of Corrigan-Gibbs and Ford (2010).
Anonymity
• Ciphertext replay attack in shuffle
Flaw: The adversary can replay a ciphertext Ci of some user i from an earlier run of the
shuffle by submitting Ci as his own ciphertext. Then the adversary looks for the “inner”
ciphertext C ′i that appeared at the end of the anonymization phase (Phase 3) in both this run
and the earlier run. The adversary can conclude that the message contained in that inner
ciphertext, which was successfully decrypted in the earlier run, were sent by i.
Fix: New “outer” encryption keys are generated in each run of the shuffle.
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• Message descriptor replay attack in the bulk protocol
Flaw: The adversary can replay the message descriptor di of some user i received in an earlier
run of the bulk protocol by submitting it as his own descriptor. di contains an encrypted
seed for i that does not generate a ciphertext with a hash matching the included hash. In the
previous run, user iwas looking for a slot with descriptor matching di and used a precomputed
ciphertext for it instead of using the included seed. In this run, i is not looking for it, and
because the hash of the ciphertext won’t match the one included in di, i will send an empty
ciphertext. This identifies i as the owner of the message revealed during the slot containing
di in the previous run.
Fix: New encryption keys for the seeds in the message descriptors are generated in each run
of the bulk protocol.
• Ciphertext equivocation attack in the bulk protocol
Flaw: The adversary can target user i as the suspected owner of a slot pi(j) by sending an
incorrect ciphertext Cˆjk to i in Phase 3 and sending correct ciphertexts to all other members.
Then if a valid accusation comes out of the blame phase (Phase 5), i must be the owner of the
slot, that is, i = j.
Fix: Rebroadcast the ciphertexts before the blame shuffle, and then have users that observe
ciphertext equivocation “break” the blame shuffle and then send evidence of equivocation to
exonerate themselves and expose the equivocation member.
• Adversary copies encrypted seeds during the bulk protocol
Flaw: An adversary in the last position of the shuffle can copy the ciphertext containing a
message descriptor into his own slot. An honest member only looks for one message descrip-
tor matching her own, and therefore the owner of the copied descriptor will use the encrypted
seed in the second slot containing her descriptor, the ciphertext won’t match the hash, and so
she will send an empty ciphertext. This identifies herself as the owner of the slot containing
the first copy of the descriptor, which does have its message revealed.
Relatedly, it appears technically possible for an adversary to create a wholly new descriptor
that contains the encrypted seed that a slot owner creates for herself in her own descriptor.
IND-CCA2 doesn’t appear to have a type of non-malleability that would prevent this kind
of copying. Thus simply looking for all copies of a member’s descriptor isn’t enough, as
the adversary could potentially target a member by copying out her encrypted seed from
her encrypted message descriptor into a totally different descriptor. The member who uses
different ciphertexts for the same seeds is the owner of the (original non-modified) descriptors.
Fix: Have members look for all copies of their encrypted seed, and use the same precomputed
ciphertext in each of those slots.
Accountability
• Ciphertext duplication attack in the shuffle
Flaw: An adversary in the first position of shuffle can use as his own ciphertext submission
the ciphertext that an honest member submits into the shuffle. The shuffle fails when dupli-
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cate ciphertexts are observed, and both the honest and dishonest members are exposed. This
violates accountability, which prohibits exposing honest members.
Fix: Members must first commit publicly to their ciphertext submission using non-malleable
commitments and including their identity (e.g. their shuffle position) in the commitment.
• Equivocation in proceeding to blame in the shuffle
Flaw: If all GOi = TRUE in the verification phase (Phase 4), but dishonest j pretends to
honest k that j received GOi = FALSE from i by only sending blame data in the last phase
(i.e. executing Phase 5b), while sending his private keywj to all other members (i.e. executing
Phase 5a with respect to them), then it is not clear if liveness assumption implies that k can
eventually get enough blame data from the other members (who see everything go correctly,
proceed to Phase 5a, and finish the protocol) to expose a faulty member.
Fix: The key release and blame phases (Phase 5a and 5b) are now unconditionally run in
sequence. A member must justify in the blame phase not sending out aprivate key in the
key-release phase with enough evidence to expose another member.
Integrity
• Ciphertext equivocation attack in the bulk protocol
Flaw: The adversary can send a bad ciphertext to just one member, who, if not the owner,
will never receive a valid accusation and so will complete successfully without all honest
members’ messages.
Fix: As described earlier as the fix to an anonymity attack, we rebroadcast the ciphertexts
before the blame shuffle, and then we have users that observe ciphertext equivocation “break”
the blame shuffle and then send evidence of equivocation to exonerate themselves and expose
the equivocating member.
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